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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the relationship between capital account liberalization and macroeconomic
volatility using Brazil as a case study. The paper provides several stylized facts regarding the
evolution of capital flows and controls in Brazil in the last three decades. We conclude that,
notwithstanding the financial crises and macroeconomic volatility of the recent past, capital account
liberalization and the floating exchange regime have led to a more resilient economy. Further
liberalization of the capital account is warranted and should be accompanied by a broad range of
reforms to improve and foster stronger institutions.
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last few years, there has been a revival of the notion that capital controls 
may be a  necessary  evil. The main argument is  that, although capital controls may 
introduce some economic distortions, excess capital mobility is partially responsible for 
financial  crises  (and  macroeconomic  instability)  in  emerging  market  economies 
(Stiglitz,  2002).  Capital  controls,  goes  the  argument,  provide  emerging  market 
economies  the  means  to  prevent  these  unpleasant  consequences.    However,  recent 
papers  (e.g.,  Edwards,  2005)  have  found  no  systematic  evidence  suggesting  that 
countries with higher capital mobility tend to have a higher incidence of crises.  
 
Detailed case studies may provide evidence for this debate. The Brazilian case 
provides  an  interesting  example.  Although  Brazil  still  adopts  a  complex  web  of 
bureaucratic  controls  on  capital  flows,  in  the  last  fifteen  years  it  has  been  more 
financially open than other large emerging market economies, in particular China and 
India. The analysis of Brazil, a large sub-investment grade emerging market economy, 
relatively integrated to the financial world and that has suffered both from financial 
crises and macroeconomic volatility, could shed further light on the capital controls 
issue. This paper details the experience of Brazil with capital mobility and controls.   
 
Macroeconomic performance in Brazil has indeed been quite volatile over the 
last 30 years. Part of this volatility can be traced to a sequence of financial crises, 
sudden stops and a boom-and-bust pattern of current account deficits and capital flows. 
Brazil experienced two large cycles of current account deficits, one in the 1970s that 
lasted until the debt crisis of the early 1980s and the second in the 1990s, that ended 
with an abrupt reversal of the current account deficit after the 2002 electoral crisis.  
 
Currently, Brazil is running a current account surplus of almost 2% of GDP, 
receiving approximately 2% of GDP in net foreign direct investment (FDI) and, for the 
first  time  in  decades,  reducing  its  external  debt.  In  this  environment,  one  wonders 
whether this performance is the sign of a new trend or the beginning of yet another 
cycle that eventually will reverse course. The issue is whether a regime based on a 
floating exchange rate, inflation targeting, fiscal responsibility and a relatively more 
open financial account induced a structural change? It is difficult to judge at this point.   3 
However, the combination of a few factors suggests a new trend. First, the floating 
exchange rate regime is providing more incentives for borrowers to better assess risk, in 
particular in the non-tradable sector. Second, exports are increasing in a magnitude not 
seen before, leading to a record low ratio (still high by international comparison) of 
external debt to exports. Third, the larger role of net direct investment in the latest surge 
in capital flows is encouraging from a debt accumulation perspective. Nevertheless, 
more analysis is needed. From an historical perspective, a relevant question is how does 
the current phase compare to the previous adjustment undertaken after the debt crisis of 
the 1980s? It is important to look at the past experience in Brazil.  
 
In the last 15 years Brazil has also started liberalizing its capital account. The 
liberalization was a gradual process of establishing new rules on capital inflows and 
outflows. The result of the liberalization process was: (i) reduction or elimination of 
taxes  on  foreign  capital  financial  transactions  as  well  as  of  minimum  maturity 
requirements on loans; (ii) elimination of quantitative restrictions on investments by 
nonresidents in financial and capital markets securities either issued domestically or 
abroad; (iii) permission for residents to issue securities abroad, including debt, without 
prior approval by the Central Bank; (iv) more freedom for residents to invest in FDI and 
portfolio abroad; and finally (v) introduction of currency convertibility initially through 
the mechanism of “international transfers in reais,” whereby residents could transfer 
their resources abroad through the use of nonresident accounts. Since March 2005 a 
more direct procedure is in place. 
 
   In spite of the liberalization the resulting system does not mean unrestricted 
freedom or free convertibility.
1 Export proceeds still are required to be converted into 
domestic  currency  (“exports  surrender”)  and  there  are  limits  on  foreign  currency 
deposits. Current currency convertibility is based on monetary authority’s rules instead 
of laws. Therefore, they can be lifted at any time. In addition, the public opinion still 
associates transfers abroad with illicit or antipatriotic practices.
 Also, notwithstanding 
the efforts to consolidate the exchange and capital account rules, the regulation is still 
fragmented  and  involves  rules  set  in  different  contexts  and  driven  by  various 
motivations. 
                                                
1 The complete set of existing capital controls is presented in appendix A.    4 
 
A consolidation of the whole regulation in a unified law approved by Congress 
is necessary. Reduction in bureaucratic requirements is needed as well. The rules would 
become  less  uncertain  and  clearer.  These  changes  would  facilitate  the  change  in 
mentality,  originated  back  in  the  capital  flight  period,  when  transfers  abroad  were 
necessarily associated with illicit or antipatriotic practices. 
 
The large volatility of capital flows has been one of the main arguments for 
those that oppose complete liberalization of capital movements. Since liberalization in 
Brazil has occurred in parallel to a period of higher macroeconomic volatility, one could 
wonder whether the case of Brazil reinforces the argument. The key points of the paper 
do not point in this direction:  
 
i.  The  debt  accumulation  pattern  changed  substantially  after  the 
liberalization of the capital account and, especially, after the floating of the currency. 
The private sector decreased significantly its issuance of external debt. The reduction in 
private debt resulted partly from the abrupt interruption of access during the crises but 
also from the floating of the currency, which ended a period of implicit guarantees that 
included a fixed parity for borrowers; 
 
ii.  The profile of external financing has also changed since liberalization 
and the floating regime. After a period based on portfolio investment, FDI replaced it as 
the main financing source. Since 1998, net direct investment has comprised more than 
100% of the net private capital flows.  In general, FDI flows tend to be more stable and 
less correlated with the other flows. Long-term debt flows worked as a stabilizing factor 
during external crises, but behaved pro-cyclically during domestic crises; 
 
iii.  Net financial flows have, in general, financed current account deficits. 
Some  differences  emerge  over  time.  Net  financial  flows  financed:  i)  a  strong 
accumulation of international reserves between 1992 and 1996; ii) a large expansion of 
the current account deficit from 1995–1997, representing a growth of both investment 
and consumption; and iii) an increase in the current account deficit from 1998–2001, 
resulting from a higher deficit in net income from abroad; 
   5 
iv.  Following capital account liberalization, consumption—its growth rate 
and share in GDP—has been more stable than in the 1980s. In comparison to the 1990s 
growth episodes, economic growth in 2000–2001 and at the present (2004) took place in 
a different context. First, net capital flows have been of a lower magnitude and have 
been dominated by FDI. There has been no significant surge of short-term flows or 
portfolio  investment.  Second,  the  expansions  have  been  accompanied  by  a  more 
favorable  situation  in  the  trade  balance.  Third,  one  could  argue  that  fundamentals 
improved  with  the change  in  the fiscal  policy  regime and  the  adoption  of  inflation 
targeting; 
 
v.      Sudden stops are more pronounced when the crisis is mostly domestically 
driven. Analysis using a vector autoregressive (VAR) estimation indicates that shocks to 
the  country  risk  premium  (measured  by  the  EMBI)  have  the  clearest  effect  on 
macroeconomic performance. Higher country risk levels induce greater interest rates, a 
more depreciated exchange rate, a reduction in capital inflows, and lower output. This 
lead us to the importance of building up good fundamentals in the economy.  
 
These key points lead us to conclude that, notwithstanding the financial crises 
and macroeconomic volatility of the recent past, capital account liberalization has led to 
a more resilient economy. Therefore, further capital account liberalization should be 
considered.  Liberalization  should  be  accompanied  by  a  broad  range  of  reforms  to 
improve  and  foster  stronger  institutions—such  as  approval  of  de  jure  central  bank 
independence (not only de facto)—establish a longer track record of responsible fiscal 
policy (under the fiscal responsibility law) and reduce microeconomic inefficiencies and 
contractual uncertainties.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the balance of 
payment stylized facts of the last three decades (current account cycles, capital flow 
cycles and composition, and debt accumulation). Section 3 describes the evolution of 
capital controls in Brazil and evaluates the benefits and costs of further capital account 
liberalization.  Section  4  examines  the  volatility  of  capital  flows  in  general  and  the 
behavior  of  the  flows  during  financial  crises.  Section  5  analyzes  the  relationship 
between  capital  flows  and  macroeconomic  performance  in  Brazil,  evaluating  what 
capital  flows  have  financed,  the  recent  growth  pattern,  and  whether  there  is  more   6 
consumption smoothing. In addition, we conduct some estimations on the determinants 
of  capital flows and  develop a  structural VAR to  estimate  the  relationship between 
capital  flows  and  macroeconomic  performance.  The  final  section  presents  the  main 
conclusions. 
 
2. Stylized facts  
 
Macroeconomic performance in Brazil has been volatile. Part of this volatility 
can be traced to the boom-and-bust pattern in the balance of payments. In fact, there 
have been long and pronounced cycles of current account deficits that ended abruptly. 
Each cycle had its own history: different types of capital flows financed the boom, 
sudden stops had different characteristics, and policy behavior was distinct. 
 
Brazil is currently in a post-adjustment period, running both trade and current 
account surpluses. How does the current phase compare to the previous adjustment after 
the debt crisis? 
 
This section provides the stylized facts of the main components of the balance of 
payments in the last decades, starting with the current account cycles, but then focusing 
on the capital flows, and the accumulation of external debt.  
 
2.1. Current account cycles 
 
  In  the  last  decades,  Brazil  experienced  two  large  cycles  of  current  account 
deficits, one in the 1970s, which lasted until the debt crisis of early eighties, and the 
second in the 1990s, punctuated by the crises of the last few years. Figure 1 shows the 
behavior of the current account and “private capital account", defined as the capital and 
financial accounts minus official-agency-related loans.
2 These long periods of current 
account deficits were financed by voluntary capital flows. The first period was also a 
period of high average GDP growth, but this was not the case in the second period. 
Tables 1 and 2 show annual values and period averages for broad categories of the 
balance of payments as a percentage of GDP as well as for GDP growth rate. 
                                                
2 See Appendix C for a more detailed explanation of the capital flows variables used in the text. The 
figures in the text are shown either as percentage of GDP or based on constant 2003 U.S. dollars.    7 
 
  The  behavior  of  the  current  account  has  been,  in  general,  dominated  by  the 
dynamics of the trade balance, whose deficit cycles are financed by large expansions of 
capital inflows. Figure 2 depicts the path of the trade balance and income balance (net 
remittances  abroad  of  wages,  profits,  dividends,  and  interests),  which  are  the  main 
components of the current account.
3 
 
To  analyze  the  current  account  performance  in  a  broader  macroeconomic 
context, internationally as well as domestically, including the effect of policy decisions, 
we subdivide the current account performance into five phases since the mid-1970s:  
 
1974–1982: the second National Development Plan (II PND) and external debt 
accumulation. The economy presented large trade deficits from 1974 through 1980—
averaging 1.6% of GDP—as a result of the heavy investments under the II PND and the 
two oil price shocks (1973 and 1979). The current account deficit was also exacerbated 
by the increase in U.S. interest rates in 1979. The deficits were financed basically by 
syndicated loans, in the context of a large expansion of international financial market 
liquidity.  The  external  financing  and  investments  under  the  II  PND  supported 
maintenance of high economic growth—GDP growth average of 7.0% in the 1974–
1980 period—despite the oil crisis. The inflation rate was also increasing, rising from 
15.5%  in  1973  to  110.2%  in  1980  (measured  by  IGP-DI—General  Price  Index). 
However, external debt reached high unsustainable levels, leading to the 1982 external 
debt crisis; 
 
1983–1994: External debt renegotiation, current account adjustment, and high 
inflation. With the interruption of voluntary capital flows, the economy had to generate 
trade  surpluses  to finance the income  account deficits. In  fact,  after the 1981–1983 
adjustment—maxi-devaluation  of  the  domestic  currency  and  tightness  of 
macroeconomic  policy—the  economy  generated  large  trade  surpluses  from  1983 
through 1994 (averaging 4.0% of GDP). In 1984, the trade surplus peaked at 6.9% of 
GDP. The current account balance stood around zero, except for the deficits at the end 
of  1986  and  beginning  of  1987,  as  a  result  of  the  Cruzado  Plan.  GDP  growth  fell 
                                                
3 Current account balance º trade balance + balance of services + income balance + current transfers 
balance.   8 
significantly, averaging 2.0% from 1983 through 1992, reaching negative values in four 
of these years. It was also a period of high inflation, which peaked at 82.4% per month 
in  March  1990  and  47.4%  in  June  1994  (measured  by  IPCA—Broad  National 
Consumer  Price  Index).  Several  stabilization  programs  tried  to  curb  inflation,  but 
achieved only temporary success. The end of the high inflation period came with the 
Real Plan, launched in July 1994. The process of external debt renegotiation underwent 
several  phases,  eventually  concluding  with  the  conversion  of  the  loans  into  debt 
securities under the Brady Plan in April 1994.
4 From 1992 through mid-1994, exchange 
rate policy, under a managed system, basically aimed to keep constant the purchasing 
power  of  the  domestic  currency,  as  we  can  see  in  Figure  3,  which  shows  the  real 
effective exchange rate and the trade balance; 
 
1995–1998: New cycle of trade deficits, low inflation, and financial crises. The 
revival of capital flows to emerging market economies at the beginning of the 1990s, 
the regulation changes in the capital account, and the external debt restructuring ended 
the external financing restrictions of the 1980s. Moreover, for the first time in more than 
three decades, the economy enjoyed a low-inflation environment. In 1995, inflation fell 
to 22.4%, and in 1998 reached 1.7%. The stability brought by the Real Plan was also 
accompanied by a relatively short economic growth cycle, as depicted in Figure 4. In 
the initial months after the launch of the Real Plan, a floating system was adopted, 
followed  the  following  year  by  a  crawling  band,  which  increasingly  turned  into  a 
crawling peg. Figure 5 shows the steady and low rate of adjustment in the nominal 
exchange rate, which led to a substantial appreciation of the real effective rate (Figure 
3). As a consequence of the surge in capital inflows, exchange rate overvaluation, and 
higher economic growth, large trade deficits emerged from 1995 through 1998 (average 
of 0.7% of GDP, which is a value largely underestimated by the increase in dollar-
denominated GDP resulting from the exchange rate overvaluation). The capital inflows 
that  financed  the  deficits  were  predominantly  portfolio  investment  (equity  and  debt 
securities), mainly until 1996–1997, when foreign direct investment started to assume 
greater significance. The economy was hit by external financial crises (Mexican, Asian 
                                                
4  In  1991,  Brazilian  government  and  the  creditor  private  banks  committee  renegotiated  the  delayed 
interest payments of 1989 and 1990, and, in the following year, agreed on a term sheet that set some 
principles for the negotiation. At end-1993, a final agreement was reached, under the guidelines of the 
Brady Plan, by which the loans were converted into sovereign bonds, some of them having U.S. Treasury 
bonds as collateral. The conversion occurred in April 1994. For an institutional description of the process 
of renegotiation, see Cerqueira (2003).   9 
and Russian) and faced the domestic exchange crisis in 1998, which ended with the 
collapse of the exchange regime in January 1999; 
 
1999–2001: Floating exchange system, inflation targeting, sound fiscal policy, 
and reversal of trade balance deficits. Economic policy had to deal with the exchange 
rate crisis and undertake a substantial change in the fiscal regime. A floating exchange 
rate  system and an inflation-targeting regime were adopted,  and substantial primary 
surpluses generated. Public sector primary surplus rose from 0.0% of GDP in 1998 to 
3.2% in the following year, reaching 4.4% in 2003. The exchange rate depreciated from 
R$/US$ 1.22 in mid-January 1999 to R$/US$ 2.16 at the beginning of March. In June 
1999, inflation targets were announced for that year and the following two years. It was 
a period of transition in terms of current account adjustment. The trade deficit fell from 
0.8% of GDP in 1998 to 0.2% in 1999, turning into a surplus of 0.5% in 2001; 
 
2002–to the present: Confidence crisis and large current account adjustment. 
Throughout  2002,  with  the  electoral  uncertainties,  the  economy  faced  a  confidence 
crisis. Country risk premiums and the exchange rate rose sharply. After the transition of 
the prior years, large trade surpluses solidified from 2002 onward. The surpluses are a 
consequence of significant exchange rate depreciation, strong world economic growth, 
and  a  few  specific  bilateral  trade  agreements.  In  2003  and  2004,  the  trade  surplus 
reached 5.0% and 5.6% of GDP (US$ 24.8 billion and US$ 33.7 billion), respectively, 
leading to a current account surplus of 0.8% and 1.9% of GDP. The positive results in 
the trade balance have been accompanied by both export and import growth. In 2004, 
exports  and  imports  reached  US$  96.5  billion  and  US$  62.8  billion,  respectively, 
representing an increase of 32.0% and 30.0% in relation to the previous year. In fact, as 
we can see in Figure 6, the degree of trade openness of the economy—measured by the 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP—has reached the record level of 26.5%, in sharp 
contrast to a 14.0% average in the 1990s. 
 
Therefore, Brazil is currently in a post-adjustment period, running both trade and 
current  account  surpluses.  How  does  the  current  phase  compare  to  the  previous 
adjustment after the debt crisis? In both cases, there was a strong reversion of the trade 
deficit cycle. The trade balance rose from -1.2% of GDP in 1980 to 6.9% in 1984, and 
from -0.8% in 1998 to 5.6% in 2004. Similarly, the trade adjustment was stimulated by   10 
a  substantial  exchange  rate  devaluation,  which  simultaneously  generated  significant 
inflationary  pressures.  However,  the  two  adjustments  present  some  important 
differences. First, the economic slowdown in the 1980s adjustment was substantially 
higher than in the 2000s. GDP accumulated a contraction of 6.3% in the 1981–1983 
period. In the recent adjustment, the higher troughs, considering four-quarter cumulative 
GDP,  were  of  -0.5%  in  1999:3,  0.0%  in  2002:2,  and  0.5%  in  2003:4.  Second,  the 
exchange  rate  movement  was  higher  in  the  recent  adjustment.  The  real  effective 
exchange rate rose by 35% in the months following the maxi-devaluation of February 
1983 in comparison to the previous months. In 1999, the increase was around 47%, and 
accumulated  66%  until  2001.  Third,  the  1980s  adjustment  affected  imports  more 
intensely than exports. In 1984, imports fell by 39.4% relative to 1980, while exports 
increased 34.1%. The reduction in imports accounted for 56.8% of the change in the 
trade balance. In contrast, the recent adjustment has been incurred mainly by exports. In 
relation to 1998, exports grew 42.9% and 88.6% in 2003 and 2004, respectively, and 
imports  fell  by  16.3%  in  2003  and  grew  by  8.8%  in  the  following  year.  As  a 
consequence, although also reflecting changes in dollar-denominated GDP, the increase 
in the degree of openness has been substantially higher recently. Exports plus imports as 
a percentage of GDP rose from 18.1% to 21.6% between 1980 and 1984, whereas it 
went from 13.8% in 1998 to 26.5% in 2004. Fourth, in the 1980s, the country was 
excluded  from  international  capital  flows,  whereas,  since  the  1990s,  it  has  been 
integrated in the financial markets. Fifth, the level of import tariffs is lower currently 
than  in  the  1980s.  Sixth,  macroeconomic  regimes  are  completely  different:  low 
inflation, sound fiscal policy and better monetary institutions in the 2000s versus high 
inflation, unsound fiscal policy and weak monetary institutions in the 1980s. 
 
Although  the  trade  balance  has  played  the  main  role  in  the  current  account 
boom-and-bust cycles, the income balance has undergone important changes as well. 
Since 1998, the income deficit has reached a higher level (1998–2003 annual average of 
3.4% of GDP), as a result of the surge in capital inflows, which increased nonresident-
owned assets in the economy. As a consequence of the external debt conversion under 
the Brady Plan and the change in the pattern of capital inflows—from loans to direct 
and  portfolio  investment—the  composition  of  the  income  balance  has  changed 
significantly  since  the  1990s,  as  we  can  see  in  Figure  7.  The  deficit  in  portfolio 
investment income, rather than the deficit in other investments income, has become the   11 
main component since 1997, accounting for 46.8% of the investment income deficit 
from  2000  through  2003.  The  share  of  the  income  deficit  attributable  to  direct 
investments  rose  to  22.6%,  whereas  the  share  of  the  deficit  attributable  to  other 
investments income decreased to 30.6%. 
 
2.2. Capital flows cycles and their composition  
 
Although current account cycles have a corresponding capital flow financing, it 
is not necessarily the case that capital flows behave in the same manner in each cycle. In 
fact, there are major differences in the composition of capital flows across the current 
account cycles—private versus public, portfolio or FDI—that we opted to subdivide the 
capital flow behavior into three longer periods (instead of the five above). We detail the 
methodological  decomposition  of  capital  flows  into  six  categories  in  Appendix  C. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the path of the main categories. 
 
1970s–1982: Loan flows and external debt accumulation. In the context of a 
significant  liquidity  expansion  in  international  financial  markets,  Brazil  received 
massive capital inflows. Table 3 shows, for each period, the average of different flows 
(as a percent of GDP). The private capital account balance averaged 3.8% of GDP from 
1974 through 1982. As recorded in Figure 9, the majority of capital inflows were loans, 
comprising 74.3% of the private capital balance. In contrast, portfolio investment was 
minimal (a 5.4% share in the flows). As a result, gross external debt, as a percentage of 
GDP, from 16.8% in 1970, reached 31.5% in 1982, and peaked at 53.8% in 1984 (new 
flows in the context of debt renegotiation, and maxi-devaluation of domestic currency 
reducing dollar-denominated GDP); 
 
1983–1991:  Shortage  of  capital  flows.  The  external  debt  crisis  and  debt 
renegotiation—extended until 1994—dominated the period. The scarce capital flows 
were basically part of debt renegotiation. The private account balance averaged 1.7% of 
GDP in the period (declining to 1.0% when excluding 1983–1984). In 1983 and 1984, 
the country still received positive loan flows, but under the debt renegotiation. In fact, 
the loan flows balance remained negative for one decade (1985–1994). Likewise, the 
negligible  positive  portfolio  investment  turned  into  (negligible)  negative  flows.  Net   12 
direct investment was affected as well. As a percentage of GDP, they fell from 0.6% of 
GDP, in the previous period, to 0.2%; 
 
1992–to  the  present:  Financial  openness,  reintegration  in  the  international 
financial markets, and large swings of capital flows. The country was reintegrated into 
cross-border  flows.  The  resumption  of  capital  flows  to  Brazil  was  associated  with 
several factors: i) increase in international liquidity and expansion of pension and hedge 
funds;  ii)  the  process  of  capital  account  liberalization;  iii)  high  yield  differentials 
between  domestic  and  foreign  bonds;  iv)  the  end  of  the  external  debt  restructuring 
period; and v) higher macroeconomic stability with the launch of the Real Plan. The 
three main characteristics of capital flows in this period were the following: i) important 
role  played  by  portfolio  investment;  ii) large  swings  in  capital  flows  ("sudden  stop 
crises"); and iii) increasing role of foreign direct investment.  
 
The resumption of capital flows was dominated by portfolio investment.
5 Except 
for  brief  pauses  during  the  Mexican  and  Asian  crises,  portfolio  inflows  increased 
systematically and reached a four-quarter cumulative average of US$ 20 billion between 
1996 and mid-1998. Portfolio investment accounted for 73.0% of the private capital 
account balance between 1992  and 1998, averaging 2.3%  of GDP.  In general, debt 
securities flows were larger than equity flows. The expansion of debt securities was 
reinforced by the return of the government to the international financial markets after 
the debt restructuring, with the first issuance of sovereign bonds taking place in mid-
1995.  
 
Portfolio  investment  also  played  an  important  role  in  the  large  capital  flow 
swings  associated  with  the  financial  crises,  more  intensely  in  the  domestic  crises 
(exchange crisis in 1998–1999 and confidence crisis in 2002). The net portfolio balance 
amounted to US$ -11.2 billion from 1998:3 through 1999:1, and to US$ -7.6 billion in 
the last three quarters of 2002. 
 
                                                
5 The category portfolio investment follows IMF' s definition. It is represented by cross-border investment 
in equity securities that is not classified as direct investment, and debt securities. This category includes 
securities negotiated in Brazil and abroad   13 
The other component that played a key role during the sudden stop crises was 
"other short-term assets". These flows are, in general, negative because they basically 
refer to transfers of domestic currency abroad. Similar to portfolio investment, the main 
negative peaks of this group were associated with the financial crises. The higher trough 
took place in the exchange crisis, when its negative balance summed to  US$ -15.2 
billion in the last three quarters of 1998. These outflows were associated with growing 
doubts  about  the  sustainability  of  the  exchange  rate  regime,  and  the  corresponding 
expectations of currency devaluation. It was a way of protecting asset values in terms of 
foreign currency and having capital gains in terms of domestic currency. For those who 
had  issued  foreign-currency  denominated  or  linked  debt,  it  represented  a  way  of 
hedging against prospective devaluation. After the devaluation in January 1999, these 
outflows fell significantly and were increasingly lower, except during the confidence 
crisis, when they reached a balance of US$ -5.6 billion in the last three quarters of 2002.  
 
The main change in the profile of capital flows in the second half of the 1990s 
was the increasing role played by foreign direct investment. In fact, since 1998, net 
direct investment has become the main inflow group. These inflows followed a cycle of 
expansion, from mid-1990s through 2002, peaking in 1999 and 2000. The expansion 
was stimulated by the improvement in domestic macroeconomic conditions with the 
Real Plan, the lifting of restrictions on foreign investments in some sectors, and the 
wave of privatizations. The change to a low-inflation environment has reduced the level 
of uncertainty in the economy and ended the distortions brought about by high inflation. 
Furthermore, the passage to a more solid macroeconomic regime in 1999 has built a 
better economic environment.  
 
Privatization  was  not,  however,  the  main  component  of  net  foreign  direct 
investment (Figure 10). From 1997 through 2000, privatizations accounted for 25.0% of 
net FDI. These data, however, tend to underestimate the contribution of privatization 
because  they  do  not  include  additional  capital  inflows  in  the  form  of  investment 
following privatization. In spite of the reduction in FDI, the levels have been relatively 
high.  Net  FDI  stood  at  US$  10.1  billion  and  US$  18.2  billion  in  2003  and  2004, 
representing  2.1%  and  3.0%  of  GDP,  respectively.
6  Therefore,  in  recent  years,  the 
                                                
6 The 2004 figures include large operations involving a single firm.   14 
pattern  of  external  financing  has  shifted  from  debt  inflows  to  direct  investment. 
Moreover, as we can see in Figure 8, net direct investment was much less affected than 
the other components during the crises. 
 
Flows related to official agencies have demonstrated large increases when there 
was  a  sharp  reduction  in  private  capital  flows,  working  clearly  as  “compensatory 
flows”. Figure 11 shows the balance of the private capital account and the official-
agency-related loans. The role of these flows is evident during both domestic crises. 
Between 2002:2 and 2003:3, net credits from the IMF reached US$ 22.7 billion (a gross 
credit of US$ 33.6 billion). The correlation coefficient between the two groups is -0.17 
(1992:2–2004:2). 
 
Using the definition of short- and long-term flows described in Appendix C, 
Figure 12 shows that short-term debt flows were preponderant between 1993 and 1996, 
and were clearly affected by the crises. Long-term debt flows, in turn, fell significantly 
during  the  domestic  crises.  Therefore,  it  seems  that  short-term  flows  were  more 
sensitive to contagion crises than long-term flows, but the latter did not work as a factor 
of stability during domestic crises. 
  
2.3. The stocks: has the accumulation of external debt been halted? 
  
  The  revival  of  capital  flows  to  Brazil  was  accompanied  by  an  increase  in 
external debt, mainly in the second half of the 1990s. Figure 13 shows gross and net 
external debt as a proportion of GDP.
7 This ratio, however, is largely affected by the 
effect of exchange rate variations on GDP measured in dollars. Considering the debt 
level at constant prices, Figure 14 shows the path of both public and private external 
debt.  
 
  The debt accumulation in the second half of the 1990s was primarily undertaken 
by the private sector. The lower interest rates on external debt relative to domestic debt, 
the stability of the exchange rate, and the associated implicit guarantee of exchange rate 
system continuity worked as important stimuli for the issuance of external debt, in the 
                                                
7  Net  external  debt  is  obtained  subtracting  reserves,  commercial  banks'   assets,  and  Brazilian  credits 
abroad from gross debt.   15 
context of abundant international liquidity. Private external debt was rapidly increasing 
between  1992  and  1998,  rising  from  US$  21.9  billion  to  US$  112.3  billion.  As  a 
consequence, the share of private sector debt in total external debt rose from 17.0% to 
50.2%. 
 
The debt accumulation pattern has changed substantially after the float and large 
depreciation of the currency. The private sector significantly decreased its issuance of 
external  debt,  leading  to  a  strong  decline  in  private  external  debt, from  US$  111.6 
billion in 2000 to US$ 71.7 billion in September 2004. The reduction in private debt 
resulted partly from the abrupt termination of access during the crises, but also from the 
increased  uncertainty  that  a  floating  exchange  regime  introduces  to  borrowers.  For 
agents that do not have dollar revenues, it is highly risky to issue foreign currency debt. 
Thus, the trend is for firms in the non-tradable sector to repay their debts.  
 
The public sector has also changed its behavior after the float of the currency.  
Brazil returned to issue sovereign bonds in 1995, but, since 1998, issuance of public 
external debt has been dominated by compensatory flows. After a downward trend until 
1997, the growth of public sector debt resumed during the crises under IMF programs. 
IMF debt rose from nearly zero in 1997 to US$ 8.8 billion in 1999, falling back in the 
following year with the repayments. However, in the subsequent programs, debt owed 
to the IMF debt resumed an upward trend, peaking at US$ 33.5 billion in the third 
quarter of 2003. Between end-2000 and the third quarter of 2003, IMF accounted for 
90.1% of the US$ 35.2 billion increase in public external debt. The latest repayments to 
the IMF in 2004 have reduced total public sector debt by US$ 9.3 billion between the 
third quarters of 2003 and 2004.  Overall, private debt was partly replaced by public 
debt.  
 
  In the aggregate, however, the total external debt level has been decreasing since 
2000. After peaking around US$ 225 billion in 1998–1999, it reached US$ 202.2 billion 
in September 2004. As a proportion of GDP, after reaching 45.9% of GDP in 2002, total 
external debt decreased to 34.9% in September 2004. The net-external-debt-ratio-to-
GDP fell from 35.9% to 24.9% in the same period.  
   16 
With the large expansion in exports in recent years, the ratio of gross external 
debt  to  12-month-exports  has  declined  substantially,  as  we  can  see  in  Figure  15, 
reaching 2.2 in September 2004, the lowest value in the last thirty years, and 1.6 when 
considering  net  debt.  Likewise,  the  proportion  of  interest  payments  to  exports  has 
declined steadily. It reached 15.9% in September 2004, which also represents one of the 
lowest values in the last three decades, as recorded in Figure 16.  
 
One wonders whether the remarkable decrease in debt since 2000 is the sign of a 
new trend or the beginning of yet another cycle that eventually will reverse its course. It 
is difficult to judge at this point. However, the combination of a few factors suggests a 
new  trend.  First,  more  incentives  are  being  provided  by  the  floating  regime  for 
borrowers to better assess risk, in particular in the nontradable sector. Second, exports 
are increasing in a magnitude not seen before, leading to a record low ratio (although 
still high by international comparison) of external debt to exports. Third, the larger role 
provided by net direct investment in the latest surge in capital flows is encouraging from 
a debt accumulation perspective. 
 
3. Capital controls 
 
During the 1990s, Brazil liberalized its capital account, in parallel to the process 
of trade liberalization and the surge in capital inflows. The capital account liberalization 
was a gradual process of establishing new rules on capital inflows and outflows. Figure 
17 shows an index of capital control estimated for 1990–2004: the lower the index the 
more  liberalized  is  the  capital  account.
8  The  list  of  liberalization  measures  is  vast, 
mostly adopted in the first half of the decade. Appendix A shows the current major 
restrictions,  and  Appendix  B  presents  a  chronology  of  the  main  changes  in  capital 
account regulation in the 1990–2004 period. 
 
The  result  of  the  liberalization  process  was  the  following:  (i)  reduction  or 
elimination of taxes on foreign capital financial transactions as well as of minimum 
maturity  requirements  on  loans;  (ii)  elimination  of  quantitative  restrictions  on 
investments  by  nonresidents  in  financial  and  capital  markets  securities  issued 
                                                
8 The index was elaborated using the chronology in Appendix B. We have normalized December 1999 
equal to 100, and assigned -1 to each liberalizing measure and +1 to each restrictive one.   17 
domestically  or  abroad;  (iii)  permission  for  residents  to  issue  securities  abroad, 
including  debt,  without  prior  approval  by  the  Central  Bank;  (iv)  more  freedom  for 
residents to invest in FDI and portfolio abroad; and finally (v) introduction of currency 
convertibility  through  the  mechanism  of  “international  transfers  in  reais,”  whereby 
residents could transfer their resources abroad through the use of nonresident accounts. 
Since March 2005, a more direct procedure is in place. 
 
This liberalization process occurred, however, without the necessary changes in 
the overall legislation. Each new liberalizing rule was inserted at the margin of the 
existing legislative framework resulting in a complex web of regulations. The present 
set  of  regulations  comprises  different  types  of rules  (laws,  decree-laws,  resolutions, 
memos, etc.) established in different contexts and driven by diverse motivations. 
 
The  existing  legislative  framework  dates  back  as  early  as  the  1930s.  It  was 
originally  based  on  less  liberal  principles  and  was  implemented  before  financial 
integration was an important consideration. The most important pillar of the existing 
legislation  is  that  the  domestic  currency  is  the  only  legal  tender;  i.e.,  payments  in 
foreign currency are not allowed.
9 Moreover, banking deposits in foreign currency are 
usually  not  allowed.
10  The  second  pillar  is  that  export  proceeds  are  required  to  be 
converted into domestic currency (“exports surrender”).
11 Furthermore, the netting of 
payments is not allowed, e.g., exporters cannot use their proceeds to pay for an import 
or an external debt before converting them into domestic currency.
12 
 
  However, the most important pieces of capital flow legislation were introduced 
in  the  1960s
13  to  regulate  foreign  direct  investment  and  loans.  According  to  that 
regulation, foreign capital inflows should be registered (and income tax paid) in order to 
obtain permission for associated outflows (profits, interests, royalties, and repatriation). 
                                                
9 Decree 23,501, 11.27.33, replaced by Decree-Law 857, 9.11.69 (the exception was given for some 
cases,  such  as  contracts  related  to  imports  and  exports,  exchange  contracts,  and  debt  involving 
nonresidents as creditor or debtor). Law 10,192, 2.14.01 (previously Provisory Measure 1,053, 6.30.95), 
reaffirmed those restrictions, making also clear the restriction involves indexation to a foreign currency. 
10 There are few exceptions. Currently, foreign currency deposits are allowed for embassies, international 
organisms, oil and electric energy companies, insurance companies, institutions operating in the floating 
exchange  market,  foreigners  temporarily  in  Brazil,  Brazilians  living  abroad,  Brazilian  Postal  Service 
Company (ECT), and foreign cargo companies. 
11 Decree 23,258, 10.19.33. 
12 Decree-Law 9,025, 2.27.46. 
13 Laws 4,131 (9.3.62) and 4,390 (8.29.64), and Decree 55,762 (2.17.65).   18 
This basic legislation has remained in place without major changes.
14 The legislation 
also sets the grounds for the existence of two separate exchange markets.  
 
The 1960s legislation was enacted in the context of the Bretton Woods system 
when  private  capital  flows  were  scarce  and  dominated  by  direct  investment. 
Domestically, financial markets were underdeveloped, currency was weak—reflecting 
the effects of inflation—and import substitution policies at their peak. The basic idea 
was to control and limit currency convertibility. Access to foreign currency should be 
restricted to imports—heavily taxed—and remittances, within certain limits, should be 
associated with previous registered inflows. This legislation survived the next couple of 
decades  when  the  scenario  was  dominated  by  the  debt  crisis  and  unstable 
macroeconomy.  
 
Nevertheless, the strong capital controls system did not prevent capital flight. 
The “parallel” (or black) exchange market gained importance. The exchange rate spread 
over the official exchange rate averaged 40% over the 1980s, peaking at 170% in May 
1989.
15 The high spread of the exchange rate over the official market encouraged import 
overinvoicing and export underinvoicing. Even individuals that traveled abroad had to 
resort to the (illegal) parallel market because of the extremely low limits of foreign 
currency that they were allowed to buy in the official market. 
 
  The first change in the regulation occurred in 1987 when portfolio inflows were 
allowed  through  the  establishment  of  foreign  capital  investment  companies,  foreign 
capital investment funds, and stock and bond portfolios (the so-called Annexes I to III).  
 
Other changes followed. An important reference point was the liberalization of 
the securities market to foreign institutional investors in 1991, with the so-called Annex 
IV. Other important measures that stimulated foreign capital flows at the beginning of 
the 1990s were the following: i) reduction in the tax on remittances abroad of profits 
and  dividends;  ii)  authorization  for  conversion  of  external  debt  instruments  of  the 
federal public sector, bonds, and deposits denominated in foreign currency for use in the 
National Privatization Program; iii) authorization for foreign investors represented by 
                                                
14 The main changes were the end of restrictions on investments in some sectors and lower tax burden. 
15 Ipeadata.   19 
funds, investment companies, and institutional investors to operate in the options and 
futures markets for securities, exchange, and interest rates; and iv) authorization for the 
issuance  abroad  of  convertible  debentures  and  of  Depository  Receipts  representing 
Brazilian securities, such as the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 
 
  The creation of the "floating exchange rate market"—also called "dollar-tourism 
market"—at end-1988, alongside the “commercial or free exchange rate market”, was 
another important reference point in the process of capital account liberalization. The 
goal was to bring exchange operations that were conducted in the "parallel market" into 
a regulated market.
16 Increasingly, the regulation broadened the operations that could go 
through  the  new  market.  As  a  consequence,  the  parallel  market  lost  its  economic 
significance, as reflected in the spread, which decreased significantly, averaging 14% 
and 4% in the first and second halves of the 1990s. The rates in the floating and free 
exchange markets were aligned in 1996, and the markets in practice unified in 1999.
17 
 
The  floating  exchange  rate  market  allowed  further  liberalization  of  residents 
outflows. The main change was to broaden the possibility of conversion of domestic 
into foreign currency through the nonresident accounts (the so-called CC5 accounts), 
starting at the end of 1988 and further developed in the following decade.
18 The 1960s 
legislation  determines  that  nonresidents  could  transfer  abroad,  regardless  of  any 
authorization, the balance not withdrawn coming from foreign exchange sales or money 
orders  in  foreign  currency.  However,  it  did  not  establish  what  would  happen  to 
resources from other sources. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the 
central bank extended the possibility of transferring abroad, giving a "general and public 
authorization" for transfers from nonresident  financial institutions, as pointed  out in 
Banco Central do Brasil (1993), an important official text that clarified the changes in 
the exchange regime. Any transfers above US$ 10,000.00 (afterwards changed to R$ 
10,000.00),  however,  should  be  identified  and  registered  in  the  Central  Bank 
Information System (Sisbacen). 
 
                                                
16 Banco Central do Brasil (1993). 
17 Resolution 2,588, 1.25.99.  
18 See section “Resident and nonresident accounts” in Appendix B for the specific regulation.   20 
This  transfer  mechanism  through  the  nonresident  account  was  named 
"international transfers in reais" (TIR). In practice, residents in Brazil could deposit in a 
nonresident bank’s account held in a domestic bank, that could convert domestic into 
foreign currency. In other words, residents could transfer money abroad making these 
deposits and asking the nonresident financial institution to buy foreign currency to make 
the deposit in an account abroad.
19 This mechanism has represented a crucial change in 
the  capital  account  regulation:  from  a  system  based  on  strict  limits  to  currency 
conversion—restricted only to nonresidents and outflows related to previous inflows—
to a much broader scope, extended in practice also to residents. As stressed in Franco 
and Pinho-Neto (2004), this rule represented the introduction of de facto convertibility. 
 
  Convertibility was enhanced by the authorization for non-financial resident firms 
to invest abroad up to US$ 1 million each twelve months—later expanded to US$ 5 
million—without prior authorization. When above this limit, investors should provide 
information to the Central Bank 30 days ahead of the exchange transaction.
20 These 
investments were conducted in the floating exchange rate market.
21 
 
From 1993 to 1996, however, capital inflows reached levels that prompted the 
monetary authorities to adopt restrictive measures,
22 some of them temporarily relaxed 
after  the  Mexican crisis.  The  vast  liquidity  in  international  markets,  the  more  open 
capital account and the interest differential between domestic and foreign interest rates
23 
led to a surge of capital inflows that pressured the exchange rate and the money market. 
In fact, the restrictive measures were motivated by concerns regarding the amount of 
sterilization operations—with their fiscal cost associated with the yield differentials—
and the short-term tenor of a significant portion of the inflows. 
 
  The restrictive measures involved quantitative and price-based measures, which 
constantly evolved as market participants found ways to circumvent them, as shown in 
                                                
19 For a more recent explanation of the international transfers in reais, see Schwartsman (2004). 
20 See section “Brazilian capital abroad” in Appendix B for more details. 
21 From 1988 through 1992, Brazilian investment abroad was required to be compensated by a sale to the 
Central Bank of gold bought in the domestic market for a value equivalent to the investment. 
22 See Ariyoshi et al. (2000), Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998), Garcia and Barcinski (1998), and Garcia and 
Valpassos (1998). 
23 Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998) and Garcia and Barcinski (1998) have shown that capital flows to Brazil 
responded to interest rate differentials. Our estimations also provide evidence that domestic interest rates 
have stimulated capital flows.   21 
Garcia  and  Valpassos  (1998)  and  Carvalho  (2005).
24  The  regulatory  changes 
discouraging capital inflows included: i) increase in the financial transaction tax on 
capital  inflows,  in  particular  for  shorter  term  flows;  ii)  increases  in  the  minimum 
maturity requirements for capital inflows; and iii) further quantitative restrictions on 
several  portfolio  investment  instruments.    For  example,  foreign  investment  under 
Annexes  I  to  IV  was  prohibited  to  channel  resources  to  fixed-yield  bonds  and 
debentures (although partially compensated by the creation of specific foreign capital 
fixed-income funds—FRF-CE). These prohibitions were gradually expanded over the 
period  1993–1995,  with  successive  measures  restricting  investment  in  derivatives 
markets—unless as an explicit hedge of existing contracts—certificates of privatization 
and related securities, Financial Investment Funds (FAF), futures and options markets, 
and finally other specific debt securities. 
 
Measures aimed to stimulate outflows, such as the permission for prepayment of 
foreign borrowing and import financing, were also adopted. New channels for Brazilian 
investment abroad were established, such as the Brazilian Depositary Receipts (BDRs) 
regulation, which allows residents to purchase securities of nonresident companies in 
Brazil, or the creation of Foreign Investment Funds, which facilitates purchases of debt 
securities by residents in international markets.  
 
The measures easing outflows make it clear that the overall objective was to 
reduce  net  inflows  without  affecting  the  trend  towards  greater  integration  with 
international  financial  markets.  In  fact,  the  restrictive  measures  did  not  reverse  the 
liberalization trend, but represented a “cycle” of restrictions around that trend, as we can 
see  in  Figure  17.  Furthermore,  Figure  18  decomposes  the  index  into  controls  on 
outflows and inflows, showing that the focus of the measures was inflows.  
 
The restrictive capital inflow measures did not involve foreign direct investment. 
On  the  contrary,  the  liberalization  trend  continued  through  the  mid-1990s.  The 
constitutional distinction between Brazilian firms—licensed under Brazilian laws and 
with headquarters and administration in the country—and Brazilian firms of national 
capital—restricted to those under control of residents—were removed. Likewise, new 
                                                
24 Carvalho (2005) presents different strategies used by market agents to circumvent the regulation.   22 
opportunities for investment in public utilities were opened with the Concession Law, as 
well  as  with  the  increase  in  the  ceiling  for  nonresidents’  ownership  of  financial 
institutions. Moreover, the income tax on remittance of profits and dividends abroad 
was removed. 
 
The motivation for the restrictions adopted in this period stands in sharp contrast 
to that of the 1960s legislation. The latter was established in the context of a scarcity of 
foreign resources in order to prevent capital outflows—the so-called capital flight. The 
objective  was  to  restrict  currency  convertibility  to  avoid  pressures  on  the  exchange 
rate—and their consequences on inflation and import costs—and try to preserve the 
demand for domestic currency. In contrast, the 1993–1996 restrictions were aimed to 
reduce capital inflows and ease outflows. In fact, as shown in Cardoso and Goldfajn 
(1998), capital controls were endogenous. The government reacted strongly to capital 
flows by increasing controls on inflows when these were booming and relaxing them in 
moments of distress. However, Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998) also show that, although 
the  volume  and composition  of  capital  flows  responded  to the  restrictive  measures, 
these measures were ineffective in the long run.  
 
  Starting  in  1997,  capital  controls  on  inflows  were  again  relaxed  with  the 
outbreak of the Asian and Russian crises, and later on with the Brazilian exchange 
crisis. The measures from 1997 through 1999 included reduction and later elimination 
of both the minimum average maturity for external loans and the financial transaction 
tax  on  capital  inflows,
25  and  elimination  of  the  restrictions  on  investments  under 
Annexes I to IV. In 1999, the 1993–1996 restrictive measures had all been lifted. The 
greater capital account openness culminated in Brazil accepting the obligations of IMF 
Article of Agreement VIII in November 1999.
26 
 
In the first half of the 2000s, under the new floating exchange regime adopted in 
1999,  nonresidents  were  finally  allowed  to  invest  in  the  same  instruments  in  the 
                                                
25 A 5% tax is applied to inflows related to external loans with a minimum coverage maturity of up to 90 
days. 
26  This  article  precludes  the  country  members,  without  the  approval  of  the  Fund,  from  imposing 
restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. It also forbids 
discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices. Previously, Brazil availed itself of 
the transitional arrangements of Article XIV, which allows exchange restrictions but requires countries to 
take measures towards acceptance of Article VIII as soon as conditions permit.   23 
financial and capital markets that residents do. In addition, the prepayment of external 
debt was allowed as well as the conditions for the issuance of real-denominated external 
debt were set. Also, an important development of that period was to eliminate the prior 
approval  of  external  loans  by  the  Central  Bank  of  Brazil.  In  effect,  the  current 
registration process for capital flows has become a documentary requirement instead of 
part of an active authorization process. 
 
More recently, at the beginning of March 2005, the Central Bank announced the 
unification  of  the  exchange  markets  and  clearer  rules  concerning  conversion  of 
domestic  currency  into  foreign  currency.  For  example,  the  international  transfer 
mechanism  through  deposits  in  accounts  of  nonresident  financial  institutions  was 
replaced by a more direct procedure. 
 
   In spite of the large liberalization of the 1990s, Arida, Bacha, and Lara-Resende 
(2004)  point  out  that  the  resulting  system  does  not  mean  unrestricted  or  free 
convertibility.  The  authors  list  several  limits  of  the  current  system,  including  that 
current convertibility is based on monetary authority’s rules instead of laws. Therefore, 
they can be lifted at any time. In addition, the public opinion still associates transfers 
abroad with illicit or antipatriotic practices.
27  
 
In fact, notwithstanding some efforts to consolidate the exchange and capital 
account  rules,  the  regulation  is  still  fragmented  and  involves  rules  set  in  different 
contexts and driven by various motivations. A consolidation of the whole regulation in a 
unified law is necessary. Reduction in bureaucratic requirements is needed as well. The 
rules  would  become  less  uncertain  and  clearer.  These  changes  would  facilitate  the 
change in mentality, originated back in the capital flight period, when transfers abroad 
were necessarily associated with illicit or antipatriotic practices. 
 
  A further step could be adopted. Arida (2003a, 2003b, 2004) defends a change in 
legislation so as to assure unrestricted convertibility. He argues that the introduction by 
law of free convertibility—defined as the absence of any restriction to the exchange 
between foreign and domestic currencies, although keeping the domestic currency as the 
                                                
27 See Gleizer (2005) for a collection of papers on exchange arrangements and capital flow regulation in 
Brazil.   24 
only means of domestic payments—would give a positive signal. Arida (2003b, 2004) 
stresses  that  free  convertibility  should  not  be  adopted  immediately,  but  announced 
previously  and  implemented  gradually,  accompanying  also  some  macroeconomic 
indicators and institutional changes, such as central bank independence.
28 
   
  Our  view  is  that  much  can  and  should  be  done  in  order  to  simplify  and 
consolidate current exchange regulations. The system is excessively bureaucratic and 
complicated, consequence of the patch pattern way it was created as the macroeconomic 
conditions  evolved  and  ideology  changed.  At  this  juncture  a  consolidation  of  the 
advances of the last decade should be unified in a consolidated and simple law. Further 
liberalization steps, beyond consolidation, will need to be accompanied by additional 
institutional developments as establishing central bank autonomy, solidifying the fiscal 
responsibility law and the need for a mature fiscal policy, reaching a stronger consensus 
about the necessity of lower inflation, and implementing judiciary reform and further 
microeconomic  reforms.  Complete  freedom  of  capital  flows  should  emerge  as  a 
“natural” consequence of improvements and maturity in institutions.  
 
In summary, regarding capital controls in Brazil: i) liberalization has advanced 
significantly since the 1990s; ii) the restrictive measures of the 1993–1996 period were 
mostly aimed at reducing large capital inflows and did not reverse the liberalization 
trend; iii) currency convertibility has increased significantly; iv) the current situation 
calls  for  a  simplification  of  the  exchange  market  and  elimination  of  existing 
bureaucracy; and v) the advances achieved in the last decade (through several rules) 
should be consolidated in a simple law approved by Congress.  
 
4. Volatility of capital flows and financial crises 
   
  The large volatility of capital flows has been one of the main arguments for 
those  that  oppose  complete  liberalization  of  capital  movements.  Is  the  volatility  of 
capital flows in Brazil a permanent feature? Is the volatility large across the different 
types of flows?  
 
                                                
28 Arida' s proposal has generated some controversy. An opposite view can be found in Ferrari Filho et al. 
(2005).   25 
  Besides the normal volatility analysis, it is important to verify the behavior of 
capital  flows  in  periods  of  stress,  such  as  in  financial  crises.  This  provides  more 
qualitative  information  regarding  the  whole  distribution  of  the  flows.  The  Brazilian 
economy was affected by four external and two domestic crises in the last decade: i) 
Mexican (late 1994); ii) Asian (last quarter of 1997); iii) Russian (third quarter of 1998); 
iv) Brazilian exchange crisis (late 1998–early 1999); v) Argentinean (second half of 
2001); and vi) Brazilian confidence crisis (last three quarters of 2002). Figure 19 depicts 
monthly averages of the EMBI+ Brazil,
29 whose peaks reflect the crises. In this section 
we conduct some basic estimates of volatility of capital flows and assess their behavior 
during the crises. 
 
Volatility of capital flows 
 
The results on volatility are shown in Table 4 for the 1992:1–2004:2 period 
(quarterly data). Considering the coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to 
average), net direct investment is the less volatile group, in line with the results in 
Prasad  et. al.  (2003), which shows, using a dataset  of 76 industrial and  developing 
countries, that bank borrowing and portfolio flows are substantially more volatile than 
FDI.  Portfolio  investment  is  the  most  volatile  group.  The  standard  deviation  and 
coefficient of variation of portfolio investment are 1.3 and 2.0 higher than those for 
direct investment. Note that loans are extremely volatile as well. Thus, according to 
these indicators, financing through debt securities is not more volatile than via loans. 
Furthermore, the variance of direct investment is actually underestimated because its 
average in the second half of the sample is substantially higher than in the first half. 
Considering  the  1997:1–2004:2  sample,  its  variation  coefficient  decreases  to  0.5, 
whereas that of portfolio investment rises to 3.0. 
   
When  we  use  net  flows,  however,  the  variation  coefficient  is  sensitive  to 
averages close to zero. To minimize this problem, we estimate separately the volatility 
for inflows and outflows, which are shown in Table 5. Similar to net flows, inflows and 
outflows of portfolio investment present a standard deviation significantly higher than 
                                                
29 The series refers to the sovereign spread of the EMBI until 1997:12, and of the EMBI+ thereafter. For 
simplicity, we call it EMBI along the text.   26 
that for FDI.
30 Likewise, contrary to expectations, the item "other long-term loans", 
when compared to the group portfolio investment, does not present a higher volatility.
31 
Note also that trade credits present a high variation coefficient. 
 
The literature has emphasized the volatility of short-term flows and their role 
during the financial crises. The figures on the greater stability of FDI flows support this 
analysis. However, the same does not apply when we compare short- versus long-term 
debt flows. Long-term debt flows present a higher standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation. On the other hand, when including the groups "other short-term assets" and 
net direct investment in the short- and long-term flows, respectively, the volatility is 
significantly lower in the latter. Nevertheless, as we can see in Figure 12, net short-term 
debt flows have been relatively more stable since mid-1999, when compared to the 
previous period. 
    
We also conduct some basic analysis of the correlation between selected groups 
(Table 6). The groups equities, debt securities, loans and trade credits are positively 
correlated, although the correlation coefficients are not large.
32 Net direct investment, in 
turn, usually presents negative correlation with those groups. The correlation between 
short- and long-term flows (not shown) is significantly higher, mainly when we use 
annual  data  (correlation  coefficient  of  0.73).  This  result  strengthens  the  previous 
findings concerning similar volatilities of short- and long-term debt flows.  
 
Capital flows during crises 
 
  Sudden  stops  were  more  intense  during  the  domestic  crises  than  during  the 
external  ones.  Table  7  shows  net  flows  previous  to  and  during  the  crises.  In  the 
domestic crises, the expectation of a change in regime and depreciation of domestic 
currency stimulated capital outflows and discouraged capital inflows significantly. Net 
flows during the Mexican and Asian crises were negative only for one or two quarters, 
                                                
30 Although the variation of coefficient of inflows and outflows of portfolio investments is lower than that 
of FDI, when we consider the 1997:1–2004:2 period, the result is reversed. Furthermore, under the point 
of  view  of  pressures  on the balance  of payments,  the standard deviation measure seems  to  be  more 
relevant because it captures the absolute amount of change in the flows. 
31 It presents a higher variation coefficient when considering inflows and similar in the case of outflows, 
although it has, at the same time, a lower standard deviation. 
32 Bosworth and Collins (1999) have found no or very low correlation between foreign direct investment, 
portfolio investment and loans for a 58-developing-country sample.   27 
and recovered quickly—four-quarter cumulative flows remained positive. In contrast, 
during the exchange crisis (1999)—considering also the Russian crisis period—and the 
confidence  crisis  (2002),  the  reversal  of  flows  was  large  and  lasted  at  least  three 
quarters. From 1998:3 through 1999:1, the cumulative private capital account balance 
stood at US$ -23.2 billion, after having accumulated US$ 48.1 billion in the previous 
four quarters. In the second half of 2002, flows reached US$ -12.7 billion, following 
US$ 13.1 billion accumulated in the previous four quarters.  
 
The  reversal  in  capital  flows  in  the  exchange  crisis  was  higher  than  in  the 
confidence crisis for the following reasons: i) the economy was receiving large inflows, 
in part because of the huge spread between domestic and foreign interest rates; ii) in 
mid-1998, despite FDI growth, most of the flows consisted of portfolio investment, 
loans and trade credits, which tend to respond more quickly and intensely to crises. In 
contrast, FDI comprised a large part of the flows when the confidence crisis took place; 
iii) after some point in time most agents considered the collapse of the exchange regime 
unavoidable,  with  the  corresponding  strong  devaluation  of  domestic  currency, 
remaining doubts mainly about when it would take place. In this context, protection of 
asset values meant large positive net capital outflows. In contrast, the confidence crisis 
occurred in a different regime, and was reversed as the elected government displayed 
some  strong  signs  of  continuity  in  macroeconomic  policy;  and  iv)  the  exchange 
depreciation during the confidence crisis, after some point in time, tended to discourage 
outflows and stimulate inflows. In the exchange crisis, the decision of sticking to the 
pegged system did not allow this mechanism. 
 
  In general, the literature has emphasized the role of short-term flows during the 
financial  crises.  In  fact,  in  Brazil,  FDI  has  been  more  stable  than  other  flows. 
Nevertheless,  debt  securities,  loans  and  trade  credits  with  maturity  superior  to  360 
days—classified as long-term flows—have exerted an important role during the crises 
as well. In the moments of crisis, long-term debt inflows tended to decline as much as 
short-term  inflows.  Actually,  they  may  fall  more  as  their  horizon  is  longer  and, 
therefore, are more sensitive to uncertainties. The difference, of course, is that, with 
longer-term  debt,  outflows  are  better  distributed  over  time—lower  repayments  and 
pressure for debt rollover—tending to reduce net outflows in the short-run. However,   28 
the long-term category of the balance of payments statistics includes flows as short as 
one year, which are not enough to allow great extension of maturity.  
 
“Other  short-term  assets”  exerted  an  important  role,  mainly  in  the  exchange 
crisis. In fact, 44.3% of the deficit of US$ 25.1 billion in the private capital balance 
from 1998:8 through 1999:1 consisted of this category, which is related to the so-called 
CC5 accounts. 
 
  Sudden stops involve both the interruption of capital inflows and an increase in 
outflows. Figures 20.a to 20.c show the behavior of inflows and outflows of foreign 
investments  in  Brazilian  corporate  equities,  debt  securities,  and  long-term  loans.  In 
general,  both  inflows  and  outflows  have  played  an  important  role.  Outflows  of 
investments in equities followed closely inflows, placing in evidence their short-term 
nature. The reduction in inflows was substantially higher in the exchange crisis and took 
place  before  any  increase  in  outflows,  which  actually  started  declining  as  inflows 
reduced. In the case of debt securities, the fall in inflows was large during both domestic 
crises. Since outflows depend on the due dates, a decrease in inflows took place before 
an increase in outflows for both debt securities and long-term loans. 
 
In sum, we find in this section that in general FDI flows tend to be more stable 
and less correlated to the other flows. Long-term debt flows worked as a stabilizing 
factor  during  external  crises,  but  behaved  pro-cyclically  during  domestic  crises. 
Moreover, sudden stops are more pronounced when the crisis is mostly domestically 
driven. 
 
5. Capital flows and macroeconomic performance 
 
The analysis of capital flows in Brazil naturally brings about a set of important 
questions. What has been the role of capital flows in Brazil? What have capital flows 
financed? What is the relationship with other macroeconomic variables? This section 
deals with these questions. 
 
  Initially, we investigate whether capital flows have financed a change in reserves 
or  the  capital account  balance. Thereafter, using the national accounts, we examine   29 
whether  current  account  deficits  have  financed  consumption  or  investment  or  even 
reflected greater deficit in income account. 
 
What  have  capital  flows  financed?  International  reserves  versus  current  account 
balance 
 
  Capital flows can be associated with the current account balance or changes in 
international reserves. In particular, positive net flows can be used to finance reserve 
accumulation  or  current  account  deficits.  Figure  21  shows  that  short  movements  in 
capital flows have implied changes in reserves, whereas movements of lower frequency 
are associated with current account deficits. Using quarterly data, Table 8 records the 
correlation  of  private  capital  account  with  the  current  account  balance  and  reserve 
changes for different periods. Private capital account and reserve changes are highly 
correlated contemporaneously. As expected, this correlation is higher in the 1992–1998 
period—dominated by managed exchange systems—than in the floating exchange rate 
period. As reserves respond less, the contemporaneous correlation between capital flows 
and current account deficits is higher in the latter period. Likewise, the lagged and 
leading correlations are higher in the recent period. These results indicate that, during 
the  floating  exchange  regime,  capital  flows  have  been  associated  with  quicker  and 
larger changes in the current account. 
 
  To  have  some  indication  of  when  net  capital  flows  financed  reserve 
accumulation versus current account deficits, we have calculated, for each year, the 
ratios of both reserve change and current account deficit to the capital and financial 
account  balance  (including  errors  and  omissions).  Figure  22  depicts  the  results  for 
1990–2003. The left axis shows the share of net flows used to finance current account 
deficits. Negative values correspond to years of positive current account balance (1992 
and 2003), and values greater than 100% refer to periods of current account deficit and 
reduction in reserves (1991, 1997–1999). The values in the right axis—shown in inverse 
scale—represent the share of net flows that translated into reserve increases. Negative 
values refer to periods of a reduction in reserves. Note, however, that the figure shows 
only proportions and not the amount of the values involved. 
   30 
  Capital flows were used basically to finance current account deficits, especially 
during the cycle from 1995 through 2002. The exception to the rule was from 1992 
through 1994, when most of net flows were employed to finance reserve accumulation. 
Actually,  as  we  can  see  in  Figure  23,  there  was  an  intense  process  of  reserve 
accumulation from 1992 through 1996. Reserves rose from US$ 9.4 billion at end-1991 
to US$ 60.1 billion at end-1996, and were fundamental for the implementation of Real 




What have capital flows financed? Consumption or investment? 
 
  After averaging 0.6% over 1990–1994, the current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratio 
rose by 2.8 percentage points in the 1995–1997 period, reaching 4.1% in the latter year. 
The high deficits continued in the following years, averaging 4.4% over 1998–2001. 
They reverted in 2002, with a deficit of 1.2%, and turned into surplus in the following 
years.  This  section  uses  the  national  accounts  to  have  an  indication  of  the  main 
aggregate  components  that  accounted  for  the  deficits.  National  account  statistics, 
however, have to be used with care because they do not necessarily reflect relationships 
of causality. 
 
We use the well-known basic identities of the national accounts:
34 
CA = S - I, 
 
GNDY = GDP + NYCT, 
 
S = GNDY - C, 
 
C = Ch + Cg, 
 
where CA = current account balance, S = gross domestic saving, I = investment, GNDY 
=  gross  national  disposable  income,  GDP  =  gross  domestic  product,  NYCT  =  net 
income  from  abroad  and  net  current  transfers,  C  =  consumption,  Ch  =  household 
consumption, and Cg = government consumption. 
 
                                                
33 During the 1980s, the exception was 1984–1985, with high trade balance surpluses. 
34 See, for instance, IMF (1993).   31 
  Tables 9 and 10 divide the current-account-deficit period into two phases: i) 
1995–1997, characterized by a large increase in the deficit and in domestic expenditure 
rates; and ii) 1998–2001, featured by some increase in the deficit and by a prominent 
role of the deficit in the net income from abroad. We estimate the contribution of the 
variables to  the  increase in the current account deficit  comparing the first phase to 
1990–1994, and the second phase to the first one. 
 
  According to Table 9, the  increase in the current account deficit in  the  first 
period  corresponded  to  both  an  increase  in  the  investment  ratio  and  a  reduction  in 
domestic saving. The rise in the investment ratio responded for 43.2% of the deficit 
increase in the period. In contrast, in the second period, the reduction in domestic saving 
was accompanied by a decrease, at a lower value, in the investment ratio. Table 10 
allows us to discriminate the elements behind the reduction in domestic saving. 
 
  The current-account-deficit cycle was accompanied by an increase of 2.1 p.p. in 
the consumption share in the GDP, which took place basically in 1995 and 1996, as we 
can  see  in  Figure  24.
35  In  fact,  under  the  point  of  view  of  the  national  accounts, 
consumption—household and government—accounted for the larger part (74.6%) in the 
increase  in  the  current  account  deficit.  On  the  other  hand,  because  the  share  of 
consumption is approximately four times higher than that of investment, the percentage 
increase  in  the  consumption  ratio  was  lower  than  that  of  investment  (2.7%  against 
5.9%).  The  combination  of  an  increase  in  investment  and  consumption  comprised 
117.8% of the deficit increase (net income from abroad contributed with -17.8%). 
 
  In the 1998–2001 period, however, it was an increase in the net income deficit 
that  accounted  for  most  of  the  increase  in  the  current  account  deficit.  Net-income-
deficit-to-GDP rose by 1.5 p.p., reflecting basically the debt accumulation and foreign 
investments of the previous period, besides some movements related to the domestic 
crises. 
 
In summary, the role of net financial flows in the 1990s was to finance: 
i) a strong accumulation of international reserves between 1992 and 1996; 
                                                
35 Note that the values in the right axis refer to the consumption ratio.   32 
ii) a large expansion of the current account deficit over 1995–1997, representing 
an expansion of both investment and consumption; 
iii) an increase in the current account deficit over 1998–2001, resulting from a 
higher deficit in the net income from abroad. 
GDP Growth 
 
Since the 1980s, the Brazilian economy has experienced short-lived business 
cycles. Figure 25 shows the four-quarter-moving average of GDP growth and the four-
quarter  cumulative  balance  of  the  private  capital  account  since  1992.  Economic 
expansions have lasted approximately two years. The figure also shows that there is an 
association between capital flows and output movements. The two expansions before 
the  adoption  of  the  floating  exchange  rate  regime  benefited  from  the  large  capital 
inflows. Figure 3 shows clearly the appreciation trend and the large trade deficit of the 
period.  
 
In comparison to the 1990s growth episodes, economic growth in 2000–2001 
and at the present (2004) took place in a different context. First, net capital flows have 
been of a lower magnitude and have been dominated by FDI. Actually, since 1998, net 
direct investment has comprised more than 100% of the private capital account balance. 
There has been no significant surge of short-term flows or portfolio investment. Second, 
the  expansions  have  been  accompanied  by  a  more  favorable  situation  in  the  trade 
balance. Third, the policy regime has changed to improve fundamentals. Furthermore, 
the economic slowdown was less intense in the Brazilian confidence crisis than in other 
countries’ sudden stop crises. Figure 26 shows GDP growth in the year following the 




Based on the intertemporal approach to the current account, capital flows are 
deemed to  bring about  greater consumption smoothing.
36  When facing  idiosyncratic 
shocks,  country’s  consumers  can  borrow  (or  lend)  abroad  and  reduce  consumption 
volatility.  Table  11  shows  consumption  volatility  for  three  periods.  We  compare 
                                                
36 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994, 1996).   33 
volatility after capital account openness with the periods of absence of capital flows and 
of  the  1970s  debt  accumulation.  In  fact,  consumption—its  growth  rate  or  share  in 
GDP—is more stable in the recent period than in the 1980s.
37 The standard deviation of 
consumption growth is also lower after the capital account liberalization in comparison 




What determines capital flows and their components? 
 
  To assess the main determinants of capital flows, we have estimated regressions 
for  selected  items:  private  capital  account,  official-agency-related  loans,  net  foreign 
direct investment, and net foreign investment in debt securities, equities, and loans. In 
particular, we are interested in the role played by the external and domestic interest rates 
and the crises. The main results are recorded in Table 12. We have used as explanatory 
variables: Fed Funds interest rate, domestic interest rate minus expected depreciation,
39 
and EMBI+ Brazil (sovereign spread). Although the EMBI is also affected by the Fed 
Funds rate, it tends to reflect basically the several crises. The correlation coefficient 
between the Fed Funds rate and the EMBI is -0.208. Thus, we do not include dummies 




                                                
37 In contrast, Prasad et. al. (2003) have found that the median of the consumption volatility of 22 more 
financially integrated developing countries—which include Brazil—increased in the 1990s in comparison 
to the 1980s. 
38 One should be cautious about these comparisons because the periods may involve different moments in 
the cycle, and of course GDP has additional determinants. In particular, 1983–1991 was a period marked 
by the external adjustment resulting from the debt crisis and by the recession brought about by the Collor 
Plan in 1990. On the other hand, the 1970s was a period of great economic expansion, and the last decade 
was featured by several financial crises. 
39 Calculated using the Selic in the first working day of the month divided by the expected exchange rate 
change, measured as the ratio between the forward rate for contracts due at the beginning of the following 
month and the spot rate. All dependent variables are measured at constant U.S. prices. 
40 Initially, we have conducted unit root tests—augmented Dickey-Fuller formulation—basically to avoid 
incurring spurious regression. We reject the null for all dependent variables, except for direct investment. 
In the case of the regressors, we accept the null of presence of a unit root in the U.S. and domestic interest 
rates, and reject it for the EMBI. In the estimations, we have used two-stage-least squares, employing 
standard errors corrected by Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance 
matrix. The instrument variables for domestic interest rate and the EMBI Brazil were these variables 
lagged one and two periods. We consider that the Fed Funds rate is not affected contemporaneously by 
shocks to capital flows to Brazil.   34 
The role played by the EMBI and the domestic interest rate is evident. In the 
regressions  of  the  variables  representing  private  capital  flows,  the  EMBI  enters 
significantly with a negative sign and the domestic interest rate with a positive sign, 
except in the case of direct investment. Greater yields in domestic bonds attract capital 
inflows,  and  financial  crises  stimulate  net  outflows.  The  Fed  Funds  rate  enters 
significantly only in the equity and direct investment equations, but with a positive sign. 
One  possible explanation  is that increases in the U.S.  interest rate  tend  to generate 
economic  slowdown,  discouraging  investment  in  that  country  and  thus  stimulating 
investment abroad. 
 
In contrast to the other private flows, the coefficient on the domestic interest rate 
is negative in the direct investment equation. In this case, as an increase in the domestic 
interest  rate  generates  an  economic  slowdown,  inward  direct  investment  is 
discouraged.
41 The equation for official-agency loans appears with a positive coefficient 
on the EMBI, indicating the role played by these loans in working as "compensatory 
flows" during some crises.
42 
 
The  relationship  between  capital  flows  and  macroeconomic  performance:  a  VAR 
approach 
 
  We have estimated a structural vector autoregression to further examine the role 
played by capital flows. Our interest is to assess the importance and impact of capital 
flow movements on other macroeconomic variables as well as the factors behind those 
movements.  
 
To estimate the VAR, we choose variables that are related to the behavior of the 
current account and capital flows: industrial production, current account balance, private 
capital account, terms of trade (measured as the ratio of export prices to import prices), 
EMBI+ Brazil, real effective exchange rate (measured as the value of foreign currency 
                                                
41 Since we could not reject the null of presence of a unit root in the direct investment, we have also 
estimated in first differences, after having rejected the presence of cointegration. None of the coefficients 
is significant. 
42  We  have  also  tested  for  the  inclusion  of  other  variables,  such  as  output—level  and  growth—and 
exchange  rate—measured  as  deviation  of  a  trend  estimated  using  HP  filter—but  they  did  not  enter 
significantly.   35 
in  terms  of  domestic  currency),  and  domestic  real  interest  rate  (Selic  rate).  The 
exogenous variables are the Fed Funds interest rate and the U.S. industrial production. 
 
The sample goes from 1995:1 through 2004:8. Unfortunately, although we are 
using  monthly  data,  some  of  the  results  are  sensitive  to  the  identification  structure 
assumed concerning the contemporaneous effects of the shocks. Therefore, the results 
have to be seen with caution. Appendix D brings a more detailed explanation of the 
variables and identification structure used. 
   
For simplicity, we show only the resulting impulse response functions and the 
variance error decomposition (Figure 27 and Table 13). In general, the results using the 
point estimates of the impulse response functions are consistent with the theory and 
historical evidence. The most interesting result refers to the behavior of the variables 
when the economy is hit by a shock to the EMBI. An increase in the country risk 
premium clearly leads to a positive response of interest rate, exchange rate depreciation 
(depreciation of domestic currency) and a reduction in capital flows (measured by the 
private capital account balance). Although with some lag, output falls. As exchange rate 
depreciates,  terms  of  trade  deteriorate.  These  results  are  in  line  with  the  historical 
evidence concerning the effects of several crises on the economy. 
 
As expected, in response to positive interest-rate shocks, output falls. Positive 
shocks to the current account, in turn, lead to an exchange rate appreciation, reduction 
in  the  EMBI,  and  some  improvement  in  terms  of  trade  and  output  levels.  Positive 
shocks to capital flows are not persistent but lead to a reduction in the interest rate, 
which seems to cause exchange rate depreciation. In response to a favorable shock to 
terms  of  trade,  exchange  rate  tends  to  appreciate.  Finally,  positive  shocks  to  the 
exchange rate are followed by an increase in the interest rate and EMBI. The increase in 
the  country  risk  premium,  in  turn,  tends  to  cause  a  reduction  in  the  capital  flows. 
Current account tends to respond somewhat positively. Output, however, declines, but 
reverts as the exchange rate, EMBI and interest rate return to their previous values. 
 
The variance error decomposition allows us to have an idea of the importance of 
certain shocks for forecast errors. Shocks to current account, private capital account and 
exchange rate explain large part of output forecast errors in a 12 or 24-month horizon.   36 
Interest rate shocks affect output forecast errors more strongly in the short horizon. 
Private capital account forecast errors, in turn, are largely explained by shocks to the 
EMBI, exchange  rate  and  interest  rate.  In  the case  of  exchange  rate,  shocks  to  the 
country risk premium, private capital account and current account respond for large part 
of its forecast errors. Interest rate forecast errors, in turn, are explained by shocks to 





Notwithstanding the financial crises and macroeconomic volatility of the recent 
past,  financial  liberalization  has  led  to  reduced  external  vulnerability.  Balance  of 
payments  patterns  have  changed.  Recent  growth  has  been  accompanied  by  a  more 
favorable trade balance position. The profile of external financing has improved after 
the floating of the currency. The private sector has decreased significantly its issuance 
of external debt and FDI has replaced portfolio investment as the main financing source.   
 
Liberalization of the capital account in the last fifteen years has provided more 
convertibility to the currency. The new rules, however, coexist with an old legislation 
that was established in a more control-prone environment. Therefore, the result is a 
complex web of regulations and rules that require consolidation and a mentality that still 
associates transfers abroad with illicit or antipatriotic practices (based on the capital 
flight legislation period). 
 
We  believe  further  progress  in  capital  account  convertibility  is  warranted. 
Liberalization  should  be  accompanied  by  a  broad  range  of  reforms  to improve  and 
foster stronger institutions—such as approval of de jure central bank independence (not 
only de facto)—establish a longer track record of responsible fiscal policy (under the 
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Appendix A: Main exchange restrictions in Brazil 
 
Export Surrender  
·  Export proceeds are required to be converted into domestic currency (“exports 
surrender”).  Furthermore, the netting of payments is not allowed, e.g., exporters 
cannot  use  their  proceeds  to  pay  for  an  import  or  an  external  debt  before 
converting them into domestic currency. 
 
Controls on capital flows 
·  There are generally no current taxes on capital flows. Two exceptions. Short- 
term fixed income flows (up to 90 days) are taxed at a 5% rate. Payments of 
credit card transactions are taxed at 2%. 
·  All capital flows must be registered at the Central Bank of Brazil  
 
Transfers of currency  
 
·  Transfers abroad by residents are allowed but have to be registered at the Central 
Bank. 
·  Travelers may take out or bring into the country domestic or foreign banknotes, 
checks, or traveler' s checks without restriction but must declare to customs any 
amount over R$ 10,000 or its equivalent. 
 
Limits on transactions and deposits in foreign currency 
 
·  Settlements of transactions among residents and pricing of contracts or goods in 
foreign currency is prohibited. 
·  Lending  in  foreign  currency  is  prohibited,  except  for  onlending  of  external 
foreign currency loans by banks. 
·  Deposits  in  foreign  currency  are  generally  not  allowed.  There  are  several 
exceptions.  Residents:  authorized  foreign  exchange  dealers,  tourist  agencies, 
Brazilian citizens living abroad, the Brazilian Post Office Administration, credit 
card administration companies, companies responsible for the development and 
execution  of  projects  in  the  energy  sector,  and  insurance  and  reinsurance 
companies  and  reinsurance  brokers.  Nonresidents:  embassies,  foreign 
delegations,  international  organizations,  foreign  transportation  companies, 




·  Foreign direct investment in Brazil is generally free. However, there are legal 
restrictions on participation in certain economic activities. 
·  Brazilian direct investment abroad requires prior approval by the Central Bank. 
The exception is transfers of up to the equivalent of US$5 million, including all 
remittances in the previous 12 months.  
 
Nonresident participation in local markets 
 
·  No  restriction  on  purchase  of  debt  instruments.  Purchase  by  nonresident  of   40 
shares is also generally free. There are restrictions in certain economic activities. 
·  Nonresident may issue shares (or other securities that represent ownership) only 
through  Brazilian  Depositary  Receipts  (BDRs).  The  exception  is  for 
MERCOSUR countries, where direct sales are also allowed.  
 
Resident restrictions on investment and issues abroad 
 
·  Residents  may  purchase  bonds  or  other  debt  securities  through  dedicated 
offshore investment funds (FIEX).  
·  Residents  may  invest  only  in  stock  exchanges  in  MERCOSUR  countries. 
Brazilians  are  allowed  to  purchase  Depositary  Receipts  issued  abroad  by 
companies headquartered in Brazil. 
·  Corporations may issue Depositary Receipts abroad.   41 






prior to the 1990s




Establishment of the domestic currency as the only legal tender. In other 
words, payments in foreign currency are not allowed (exceptions included 
contracts related to imports and exports, exchange contracts, and debt 
involving nonresidents as creditor or debtor). Law 10,192, 2.14.01 
(previously Provisory Measure 1,053, 6.30.95), reaffirmed those 
restrictions, and also clarified that restriction includes indexation to a 
foreign currency. 
Decree 42,820 12.16.57 Determination that "it is permissible to take out or bring in domestic and 
foreign paper currency, as well as stocks and any other financial assets 
that have monetary value" (article 17). The National Monetary Council 
(CMN), if necessary, can restrict the entry and exit of domestic paper 
money (article 20).
Decree 55,762 2.17.65 Permission for nonresidents to transfer abroad, without prior 
authorization, the balance resulting from foreign exchange sales or money 
orders in foreign currency (article 57).
Circular Letter 5 2.27.69 Classification of nonresidents’ deposit accounts into two categories: i) 
"free accounts – coming from exchange sales", and ii) "free accounts – 
from other origins". The balance of the former that is not withdrawn is 
freely convertible into foreign currency; however, if the balance is 
withdrawn and then subsequently returned to the account, it is classified 
in the second category. 
Resolution 1,552 12.22.88 Creation of the "floating exchange rate market"—also called "dollar-
tourism market"—alongside the “commercial or free exchange rate 
market”. Permission for authorized institutions to transfer their long 
foreign currency position to nonresident institutions in exchange for 
domestic currency. Furthermore, permission for the Central Bank to 
change the conditions of the floating exchange rate market at any time. 
Main changes
Circular Letter 2,259 2.20.92 L O Creation of a third category in the free accounts established in Circular 
Letter 5, complementing Resolution 1,552: "free accounts – financial 
institutions – floating exchange rate market", which can be opened by 
nonresident financial institutions and whose withdrawals and deposits are 
freely available, including those coming from exchange sales or 
purchases. 




R O Requirement that international transfers in domestic currency should be 
identified and registered in the Central Bank Information System 
(Sisbacen), when equal to or greater than US$ 10,000.00. 




E O Consolidation and revision of the regulation on nonresidents’ accounts 
and international transfers in reais. Requirement of Sisbacen identification 
when withdrawals or deposits are equal to or greater than R$ 10,000.00 
(revoked Circular Letter 5).
(1) L, R and E refer to liberazing, restrictive and regulatory measures, respectively.
(2) I and O refer to related to measures to inflows and outflows, respectively.
Resident and nonresident accounts
Notes: In this table, we focus on the so-called CC5 accounts.
(*) We focus on regulation of capital account and convertibility of domestic currency into foreign currency. Thus, we do not
deal, for example, with export and import payments. Resolutions are rules set by the National Monetary Council; circulars,
circular letters and communications by the Central Bank of Brazil; and directives by the Ministry of Finance. This
chronology was written consulting directly the rules, but using initially IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements





prior to the 1990s





Regulation of foreign capital in Brazil, basically direct investment and 
loans, and the associated remittance of income abroad.
Resolution 1,460 2.1.88 Regulation of the conversion of external debt into investment in the 
country.
Constitution  10.5.88 Restriction on foreign investment in some economic sectors.
Main changes
Resolution 1,810 3.27.91 L I Authorization of the conversion of external debt instruments of the federal
public sector, bonds, and deposits denominated in foreign currency for
use in the National Privatization Program.
Law 8,383 12.30.91 L O Elimination of the additional tax, ranging from 40% to 60%, on remittance 
of profits and dividends abroad that exceeded 12% of registered capital – 
effective 1.1.92. Reduction to 15% of the withholding tax on profits and 
dividends of nonresidents – effective 1.1.93.
Resolution 1,894 1.9.92 L I Reduction from twelve to six years of the period that investments resulting 
from the conversion of external debt instruments for use in the National 
Privatization Program are required to remain in Brazil. 
Circular 2,487 10.5.94 R I Prohibition of inflows in the form of both advances for future capital 
increases and bridge investments in anticipation of future conversion of 
debts into investment. 
Law 8,987 2.13.95 L I Opening of new possibilities for investment in public utilities with the 
Concession Law. 
Constitutional   
Amendment 6
8.15.95 L I Removal of the constitutional distinction between Brazilian 
firms—licensed under Brazilian laws and with headquarters and 
administration in the country—and Brazilian firms of national 
capital—restricted to those under control of residents—and the related 
special treatment given to the latter. Regardless of owner nationality, firms 
licensed under Brazilian laws and with headquarters and administration in 
the country were guaranteed: i) special treatment in the case of small 
firms; and ii) exclusivity rights in the mining sector. 
Constitutional   
Amendment 7
8.15.95 L I Removal of the constitutional requirement that navigation along the coast 
and in the inland waterways be conducted by national vessels.






L I Possibility for an increase in the ownership participation of nonresidents in 
financial institutions, after case-by-case analysis by the monetary 
authority, and Republic President' s final decision. 
Law 9,249 12.26.95 L O Removal of income tax, previously of 15%, on remittance of profits and 
dividends abroad.
Directive MF 28 2.8.96 R I Imposition of a financial transaction tax (IOF) of 5% on privatization 
funds, when the resources enter the country. 
Directive MF 85 4.24.97 L I Reduction in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 5% to 0% on 
privatization funds. 
Circular 2,997 8.15.00 E Introduction of electronic registration (RDE) for foreign direct investment. 
Resolution 2,815 1.24.01 L I Revocation of rule set in Resolution 2,099, 8.17.94, which precluded the 
opening of new bank branches controlled by nonresidents. 
(1) L, R and E refer to liberazing, restrictive and regulatory measures, respectively.
(2) I and O refer to related to measures to inflows and outflows, respectively.





prior to the 1990s





Regulation of foreign capital in Brazil, basically direct investment and 
loans, and the associated remittance of income abroad.
Resolution 63 8.21.67 Regulation of external loans that are on-lent by resident financial 
institutions.
Resolution 64 8.23.67 Inclusion of BNDES among the institutions authorized to on-lend loans 
under Resolution 63.
Resolution 125 12.12.69 Requirement that external loans be previously approved by the BCB.
Resolution 498 11.22.78 Determination of a minimum maturity of ten years for external loans to be 
eligible for reimbursement, reduction or exemption from income tax.
Resolution 644  10.22.80 Exemption from tax on the remittance abroad of interest, commission and 
issuance expenditures of commercial paper.
Resolution 1,289, with 
Annexes I to III 
3.20.87 Regulation of the creation, operation, and management of foreign capital 
investment companies, foreign capital investment funds, and stock and 
bond portfolios.
Resolution 1,460 2.1.88 Regulation of the conversion of external debt into investment in the 
country.
Main changes
Resolution 1,734 7.31.90 L I Authorization for certain financial institutions to issue commercial paper 
abroad.
Resolution 1,803 3.27.91 L I Reduction in the minimum maturity of external loans from ten to five years 
for those to be eligible for reimbursement, reduction or exemption from 
income tax (revoked Resolution 498).
Debt Agreement 4.1.91 E Preliminary agreement with nonresident creditor banks for the elimination 
of arrears outstanding at the end of 1990.
Resolution 1,832 5.31.91 L I Liberalization of the securities market to foreign institutional investors, via 
Annex IV to Resolution 1,289. These investments were given exempted 
from income and capital gains tax, but subject to a 15% tax on income 
remitted abroad. 




L I Authorization for the issuance of convertible debentures abroad.
Resolution 1,853 7.31.91 L O Tax exemption for the remittance abroad of interest, commission and 
issuance expenditures, applied to commercial paper, extended to floating 
rate notes, fixed rate notes, floating rate certificates of deposit, fixed rate 
certificates of deposit, publicly-issued bonds, and private issued bonds. 




L I Authorization for the issuance abroad of Depository Receipts representing 
Brazilian securities (American Depositary Receipts – ADRs, and 
International Depositary Receipts – IDRs) – Annex V.
Resolution 1,872 9.25.91 L I Permission for external borrowing for agricultural financing.
Circular 2,083 11.7.91 L I Reduction in the minimum term for on-lending opera-tions related to 
Resolution 63 from one year (investment banks and BNDES) or six 
months (commercial banks) to 90 days. 
Resolution 1,901 1.29.92 L Authorization for natural and juridical persons to invest in securities in 
Mercosur countries.
Foreign portfolio investment and external loans
 
 








R I Increase in the minimum average maturity of debt securities (commercial 
paper and those listed in Resolution 1,853, 7.31.91) to 30 months to be 
eligible for tax exemptions.
Circular Letter 2,269 4.24.92 R I Requirement that the minimum average maturity for issuance of debt 
securities must be 30 months, and increase, from 30 to 60 months, in the 
minimum average maturity required for those to be eligible for tax 
exemptions (revoked Communications 2,747 and 2,757).
Resolution 1,921 4.30.92 L Authorization for hedge operations against interest rate risk in the 
international market. 
Resolution 1,935 6.30.92 L I Authorization for foreign investors represented by funds, investment 
companies, and institutional investors to operate in the options and 
futures markets for securities, exchange, and interest rates.
Resolution 1,968 8.30.92 L Authorization for natural and juridical persons to invest in derivatives 
markets as hedge operations in Mercosur countries (replaced Resolution 
1,901).
Circular Letter 2,333 10.29.92 R I Authorization for external loans only for those with a minimum average 
maturity of 30 months.
Circular Letter 2,372 6.16.93 R I Increase in both the minimum average maturity required for the issuance 
of debt securities from 30 to 36 months, and in the minimum average 
maturity from 60 to 96 months for eligibility for reimbursement, reduction 
or exemption from income tax (revoked Circular Letter 2,269).
Circular Letter 2,373 6.16.93 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity required for loans from 30 to 
36 months (revoked Circular Letter 2,333).
Resolution 1,986 6.28.93 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity of loans from 60 to 96 months 
for those to be eligible for reimbursement, reduction or exemption from 
income tax (revoked Resolution 1,803).
Resolution 2,012 7.30.93 L Expansion of the hedge operations that firms are allowed to undertake, 
including, besides those related to interest rates previously allowed, those 
related to exchange rate and commodity prices (revoked Resolution 
1,921).
Resolution 2,013 8.19.93 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
fixed-income bonds.
Decree 995 11.25.93 R I Imposition of a financial transaction tax (IOF) of 5% on investments in 
fixed-income funds and 3% on external loans when entering the country. 
Resolution 2,028 11.25.93 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
debentures, accompanied by the creation of foreign capital fixed-income 
funds – FRF-CE, to invest in private debt securities. Portfolio investment 
by foreign investors in fixed-income instruments was restricted to those 
new funds.
Circular 2,384 11.26.93 L I In the absence of objection by the Central Bank of Brazil, automatic 
authorization for the issuance of debt securities by the private sector after 
five working days of the request for authorization. 
Resolution 2,034 12.17.93 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
derivatives markets—unless as a hedge—including operations that result 
in fixed income. FRF-CE funds were allowed to invest in federal bonds, 
derivatives and in Financial Investment Funds – FAF (revoked Resolution 
2,028).








Resolution 2,042 1.13.94 L Authorization for certain institutions to conduct swap operations involving 
gold, exchange rates, interest rates, and price indices in the over-the-
counter market. 
Resolution 2,046 1.19.94 R I Change in the regulation of investments under annexes I to IV, including 
prohibition of investment in debentures (revoked Resolution 2,013).
Circular 2,410 3.2.94 R I Termination of the automatic authorization for the issuance of debt 
securities abroad that had been set by Circular 2,384, 11.26.93. 
Circular Letter 2,444 3.14.94 R I Renewal or extension of contracts of debt securities subject to the same 
rules as new contracts established by Circular Letter 2,372, 6.16.93. 
Debt Agreement 4.15.94 E Conclusion of the arrangements to reschedule Brazil' s external debts to 
commercial bank creditors.
Resolution 2,079 6.15.94 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
certificates of privatization and related securities.
Resolution 2,105 8.31.94 L O Permission for prepayment of external loans and import financing.
Resolution 2,115 10.19.94 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
Financial Investment Funds – FAF. 
Directive MF 534 10.19.94 R I Increase in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 5% to 9% on foreign 
investment in fixed-income funds, and from 3% to 7% on external loans, 
and imposition of a tax of 1% on foreign investment in securities. 
Circular 2,492 10.19.94 R I Increase in the minimum maturity for on-lending operations under 
Resolution 63 from 90 to 540 days (revoked Circular 2,083).
Circular 2,545 3.9.95 L I Reduction in the minimum term for on-lending operations related to 
Resolution 63 from 540 days to 90 days (revoked Circular 2,492). 
Circular 2,546 3.9.95 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity required for loans from 36 to 
24 months, with maintenance of the minimum average maturity of 96 
months for those to be eligible for reimbursement, reduction or exemption 
from income tax (revoked Circular Letters 2,372 and 2,373).




L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity required for the renewal and 
extension of debt securities contracts from 36 months to 180 days, with 
maintenance of the minimum average maturity of 96 months for eligibility 
for reimbursement, reduction or exemption from income tax (revoked 
Circular Letter 2,444).
Directive MF 95 3.9.95 L I Reduction in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 9% to 5% on foreign 
investment in fixed-income funds, from 1% to 0% on foreign investment in 
securities, and from 7% to 0% on external loans. 
Resolution 2,147 3.9.95 R O Revocation of the permission for prepayment of external loans and import 
financing (revoked Resolution 2,105).
Resolution 2,148 3.16.95 L I Permission for external borrowing for the financing of agricultural 
investment. Minimum maturity for these external loans of 180 days 
(revoked Resolution 1,872).
Resolution 2,170 6.30.95 L I Permission for financial institutions to contract resources abroad, with a 
minimum maturity of 720 days, for the financing of construction or 
acquisition of new real estate ventures.
Foreign portfolio investment and external loans (continued)




Directive MF 202 8.10.95 R I Increase in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 5% to 7% on foreign 
investment in fixed-income funds, and from 0% to 5% on external loans, 
and imposition of a 7% rate on interbank foreign exchange operations 
between financial institutions abroad and institutions authorized to operate 
in the foreign exchange market, and on the formation of short-term cash 
holdings (“disponibilidades”) of nonresidents. 
Directive MF 228 9.15.95 L I Imposition of a differentiated financial transaction tax (IOF) on external 
loans according to average maturity: 5% for those with an average 
maturity of two years, 4% for three years, 2% for four years, 1% for five 
years, and 0% for six years. 
Resolution 2,188 10.8.95 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
futures and options markets (revoked Resolution 2,115).
Circular 2,661 2.8.96 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity required for external credits to 
36 months, with maintenance of the minimum average maturity of 96 
months for debt securities to be eligible for reimbursement, reduction or 
exemption from income tax (revoked Circulars 2,546 and 2,559).
Resolution 2,246 2.8.96 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest in 
Agrarian Debt Bonds (TDA), National Development Fund Bonds (OFND) 
and Siderbras debentures (revoked Resolution 2,188).
Resolution 2,247 2.8.96 L I Permission for nonresidents to invest in Mutual Investment Funds in 
Emerging Firms.
Resolution 2,248 2.8.96 L I Permission for nonresidents to invest in Real Estate Investment Funds.
Resolution 2,266 3.29.96 L I Expansion of permission for external borrowing to finance agricultural 
activities to all financial institutions, not only those participating of the 
national system of rural credit.
Resolution 2,271 4.18.96 R I Restriction of external financing for states, Federal District and 
municipalities, and their dependencies, foundations and firms, to the 
refinancing of their domestic debt. 
Resolution 2,280 5.22.96 L I Establishment of some exceptions to the restrictions set in Resolution 
2,271 (revoked Resolution 2,271).
Directive MF 241  10.31.96 L I Reduction in the differentiated financial transaction tax (IOF) on external 
loans according to average maturity: 3% for those with an average 
maturity less than three years, 2% for four years, 1% for five years, and 
0% for equal to or above five years.




E Introduction of electronic registration (RDE) for inward and outward flows, 
starting with foreign portfolio investment.
Resolution 2,345 12.19.96 L I Authorization for the issuance abroad of Depository Receipts representing 
non-voting shares of resident financial institutions with shares traded in 
the stock market – Annex V.
Law 9,430  12.27.96 E Revocation of the decrees that gave authority to the National Monetary 
Council to set some rules on nonresident income tax. As a consequence, 
termination of tax rules set in Resolution 1,853, and Circulars 2,546 and 
2,661.
Provisory Measure 1,563, 
turned into Law 9,481 
12.31.96, 
8.13.97
R I Exemption from income tax on interest, commission and issuance 
expenditures of debt securities with a minimum average maturity of 96 
months. Exemption from income tax on interest of loans with a minimum 
maturity of fifteen years.




Directive MF 85 4.24.97 L I Reduction in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 7% to 2% on foreign 
investment in fixed-income funds, from the differentiated rates to a flat 
rate of 0% on loans, and from 7% to 2% on interbank exchange 
operations between financial institutions abroad and institutions 
authorized to operate in the exchange market, and on the formation of 
short-term cash holdings of nonresidents. 
Resolution 2,384 5.22.97 L I Permission for foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest 
in convertible debentures, and futures and options markets as hedge 
operations.
Resolution 2,406 6.26.97 L I Authorization for creation of Investment Funds in Emerging Firms – 
Foreign Capital.
Circular 2,783 11.13.97 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity required for loans from 36 to 
twelve months for new loans, and to six months for renewed or extended 
loans.
Circular 2,807 2.26.98 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity required for loans from twelve 
to 24 months for new loans, and from six to twelve months for renewed or 
extended loans (revoked Circulars 2,661 and replaced Circular 2,783). 




L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity required for loans from 24 to 
twelve months for new loans, and from twelve to six months for renewed 
or extended loans (revoked Circular 2,807).
Directive MF 348 12.30.98 R I Increase in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 2% to 2.38% on 
foreign investment in fixed-income funds, on interbank exchange 
operations between financial institutions abroad and institutions 
authorized to operate in the exchange market, and on the formation of 
short-term cash holdings of nonresidents, and from 0% to 0.38% on 
foreign investment in securities. Imposition of a 0.38% rate on financial 
transfers abroad and from abroad.
Circular 2,859 1.27.99 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity required for loans from twelve 
to nine months for new loans, and from nine to six months for renewed or 
extended loans (revoked Circular 2,850).
Resolution 2,590 1.28.99 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity from 180 to 90 days for 
agricultural loans.
Resolution 2,591 1.28.99 L I Permission for foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest 
in public debt securities of the federal government.
Directives MF 56 and 157  3.12.99, 
6.24.99 
L I Reduction in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 2.38% to 0.5% on 
foreign investment in fixed-income funds, on interbank exchange 
operations between financial institutions abroad and institutions 
authorized to operate in the exchange market, and on the formation of 
short-term cash holdings of nonresidents.
Resolution 2,625 7.29.99 L I Permission for financial institutions to issue bonds abroad and use the 
proceeds freely in the domestic market as long as those resources stay a 
minimum of five years in the country.
Resolution 2,622 7.29.99 L I Permission for nonresidents to invest in futures contracts related to 
agricultural products.
Directive MF 306 8.18.99 L I Reduction in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 0.5 to 0% on foreign 
investment in fixed-income funds, on interbank exchange operations 
between financial institutions abroad and institutions authorized to operate 
in the exchange market, and on the formation of short-term cash holdings 
of nonresidents (revoked Directives MF 56 and 157).




Directive MF 306 8.18.99 L I Reduction in the financial transaction tax (IOF) from 0.5 to 0% on foreign 
investment in fixed-income funds, on interbank exchange operations 
between financial institutions abroad and institutions authorized to operate 
in the exchange market, and on the formation of short-term cash holdings 
of nonresidents (revoked Directives MF 56 and 157).
Resolution 2,628 8.6.99 L I Permission for foreign capital, registered under Annexes I to IV, to invest 
in fixed-income instruments, although within some limits (replaced 
Resolutions 2,384 and 2,591).
Resolution 2,683 12.29.99 L I Elimination of the requirement of five years for the proceeds from the 
bonds issued abroad by financial institutions to stay in the country. 
Elimination of minimum average maturity required for external loans 
(revoked Resolution 2,625).
Directive MF 492 12.29.99 R I Determination of the financial transaction tax (IOF) on external loans at a 
rate of 0% for those with average maturity above 90 days, and 5% for 
those with average maturity up to 90 days.
Provisory Measure 2,013-
4, turned into  Law 9,959
12.30.99, 
1.27.00
R O Termination of the income tax exemption on interest, commission and 
issuance expenses for debt securities with a minimum average maturity of 
96 months, and of the income tax exemption for loans with maturity 
greater than 15 years. Interest payments on all external loans and debt 
securities, regardless of the maturity, taxed at 15%.
Resolution 2,689 1.26.00 L I Regulation of investment in the financial and capital markets, allowing 
nonresidents to invest in the same instruments as residents. Inward 
investment must be registered at the Central Bank.
Circular 2,975 3.29.00 E Update on conditions for the electronic registration (RDE) of portfolio 
investment (replaced Circular 2,728).
Resolution 2,770 8.30.00 L I Consolidation of the regulation on external loans, including debt 
securities. Termination of the requirement of prior approval by the Central 
Bank for those operations, except for those involving the public sector as 
a debtor. Maintenance of the requirement of registration at the Central 
Bank for those operations (revoked 67 resolutions, 96 circulars, and 51 
circular letters, including Resolutions 63, 64, 125, and 1,986, and Circular 
2,410).
Circular 3,027 2.22.01 E Introduction of electronic registration (RDE) for external loans, including 
debt securities. 
Constitutional   




L I Exemption from the Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions 
(CPMF) for entries into foreign investor accounts involving inflows of 
financial resources to the country and remittances abroad when such 
resources are used exclusively in stock operations.
Resolution 3,217 6.30.04 L O Permission for the prepayment of external debt, including debt securities.
Resolution 3,221 7.29.04 L I Establishment of conditions for the issuance of real-denominated external 
debt.
(1) L, R and E refer to liberazing, restrictive and regulatory measures, respectively.
(2) I and O refer to related to measures to inflows and outflows, respectively.





prior to the 1990s
Circular 1,280 1.18.88 Requirement that Brazilian investments abroad be compensated by a sale 
to the Central Bank of gold bought in the domestic market for a value 
equivalent to the investment. Previously, authorization for Brazilian 
investment abroad was decided on a case-by-case basis by the monetary 
authority.
Resolution 1,534  11.30.88 As an alternative to the exchange compensation with gold mechanism, 
investment abroad by Brazilian enterprises may be authorized at the 
official exchange rate in an amount equal to direct foreign investment 
received by the firm. 
Main changes
Resolution 1,925 5.5.92 L O Termination of the mechanism of exchange compensation with gold, 
transferring the operations of investment abroad to the floating exchange 
rate market.
Circular 2,243 10.14.92 L O Authorization for nonfinancial resident firms to invest abroad up to US$1 
million without prior authorization, for each 12 months by economic 
group. When above this value, investors must provide information to the 
Central Bank 30 days ahead of the exchange transaction.
Circular 2,472 8.31.94 L O Increase in the limit of the value of Brazilian investments abroad that do 
not require previous authorization from US$ 1 to US$ 5 million.
Resolution 2,111 9.22.94 L O Authorization of Foreign Investment Funds (FIEX) for investment in debt 
securities in international markets. 
Resolution 2,318 9.26.96 L O Regulation of residents'  investments in Brazilian Depositary Receipts 
(BDRs).
Resolution 2,356 2.27.97 L O Permission for residents to invest in Depositary Receipts issued abroad 
representing resident firms’ securities. 
Circular 2,863 2.10.99 R O Increase in the minimum share of Brazilian sovereign bonds in FIEX funds 
from 60% to 80%.
Circular 2,877 3.17.99 R O Prohibition of financial institutions to invest directly or indirectly in FIEX 
funds.
Resolution 2,716 4.12.00 L O Permission for private pension funds to invest up to 10% of their 
resources in BDRs.
Resolution 2,717 4.12.00 L O Permission for insurance companies, capitalization companies, and open 
private pension funds to invest up to 10% of their resources in BDRs.
Resolution 2,763 8.9.00 E New regulation on residents'  investments in Brazilian Depositary Receipts 
(BDRs), which represent securities of nonresident companies (replaced 
Resolution 2,318).
Decree-Law 1,060, 





E Implementation of the first survey of Brazilian capital abroad, which has 
subsequently been conducted on an annual basis. The provision of 
information from residents on their assets abroad is mandatory.
(1) L, R and E refer to liberazing, restrictive and regulatory measures, respectively.
(2) I and O refer to related to measures to inflows and outflows, respectively.
Brazilian capital abroad  50 
Appendix C: Classification of capital flows 
 
In the text, we classify the items of the capital and financial account into six 
groups: net direct investment, portfolio investment, loans and trade credits, other short-
term assets, official-agency-related loans, and other items.
43 We do not use the category 
"other investments" of IMF' s classification because it consists of disparate flows. In 
particular, it includes both compensatory flows and private bank loans; thus, using the 
balance of this category may be misleading. For example, in 2002, despite negative net 
loan flows and large currency transfers abroad, the other investments balance does not 
appear as significantly negative (only US$ -0.2 billion) because of IMF loans (a net 
inflow of US$ 11.5 billion).  
 
a) Net direct investment. It follows IMF' s definition. It covers inflows (outflows) 
related to acquisition, subscription and increase in the capital of resident (nonresident) 
enterprises, and similarly flows related to partial or total sale of the capital. It also 
includes  intercompany  loans.
44  Differently  from  the  investor  in  equities,  the  "direct 
investor seeks a significant voice in the management" of the enterprise (IMF, 1993, 
p.80). In general, the criterion used is that the direct investor owns 10% or more of the 
ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for 
an unincorporated enterprise) (IMF, 1993, p.86); 
 
b) Portfolio investment.  This category follows IMF' s definition as  well. It is 
represented by cross-border investment in equity securities that is not classified as direct 
investment, and debt securities.
45 We also consider these two items separately when 
relevant. This category includes securities negotiated in Brazil and abroad; 
 
                                                
43 The balance of payments statistics are produced by the Central Bank of Brazil and are available on its 
website (www.bcb.gov.br). The statistics follow IMF' s recommendations (IMF, 1993; Banco Central do 
Brasil, 2001). Although those recommendations were implemented in 2001, the historical statistics were 
conformed to the new methodology. We do not use the statistics published in the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF, because its high level of aggregation does not allow us to make the 
classification used in this paper. 
44 It should include reinvested earnings as well, but because the data does not include this item since 
1999,  we  exclude  it  to  maintain  the  coherence  throughout  the  series.  The  statistics  do  not  include 
intercompany trade credits either. 
45 Throughout the paper, we have excluded from the series of portfolio investment and loans the values 
related to the conversion of debt under the Brady Plan, which appear in the second quarter of 1994. 
Maintaining them in the series would distort the analysis.   51 
c) Loans and trade credits. It comprises loans not related to official agencies—
which we call loans—and suppliers'  and buyers'  credits; 
 
d)  Other  short-term  assets.  This  group  aims  to  capture  the  movements  of 
currency and deposits, which played an important role during the crises. For example, in 
1998, the negative balance of this category reached US$ -17.6 billion. It consists of 
three  items  of  the  balance  of  payments  statistics:  "currency  and  deposits  of 
nonresidents"  (which  includes  flows  through  the  called  CC5  accounts  classified  as 
"disposable funds"), "currency and deposits of non-financial residents" (which includes 
deposits  available  abroad),  and  "other  short-term  assets"  within  other  domestic 
investments (which includes flows through the CC5 accounts below 10,000 reais);  
 
e) Official-agency-related loans. It consists of loans to the monetary authority 
(such as those from the IMF, BIS, Bank of Japan, and U.S. Treasury) and long-term 
financing from bilateral or multilateral organizations (such as IBD and World Bank 
Group).
46 These loans have clearly worked as compensatory flows. For instance, in the 
crisis years of 1998 and 2002, the balance of this group was largely positive, US$ 10.9 
and US$ 12.2 billion, respectively; 
 
f) Other items. This category corresponds to the remaining items of the capital 
and financial account. It includes diverse items, but quantitatively the most important 
ones are "currency and deposits of financial residents"
47 and "other liabilities" within 
other foreign investments (mainly external liabilities assumed by the Central Bank, but 
whose repayments and interests were not sent abroad duly).
48 The latter was the major 
item  of  the  group  through  mid-1990s  because  of  the  arrears  that  occurred  in  some 
periods. 
                                                
46 Before 1979, some of the items that comprise official-agency-related loans are available only on an 
annual basis. We distributed the annual values over the four quarters and added to the data available 
quarterly. 
47 We do not classify "currency and deposits of financial residents" into the group "other short-term 
assets" because they are the main counterpart of the payments registered in the balance of payments. For 
example, when a resident repays a loan, it represents a reduction in external liabilities (increase in net 
assets of residents), but as counterpart there is a reduction in the foreign assets of the bank that sold the 
foreign currency (reduction in net assets of residents). In fact, the balance of this item was positive in 
1998 and 2002. 
48  The  other items are  "capital  account" (according  to  IMF' s  (1993)  definition,  which  covers  capital 
transfers and acquisition or disposal of nonproduced, nonfinancial assets), financial derivatives, and other 
long-term assets of residents (Brazil' s participation in multilateral organizations, and greater-than-one-
year escrow deposits).   52 
 
We  also  classify  flows  according  to  their  maturity.  Short-term  debt  flows 
correspond to equities and short-term debt securities, loans and trade credits. When 
including other short-term assets, we call them "short-term flows expanded". Long-term 
debt flows in turn comprise long-term debt securities, loans and trade credits, which, 
according  to  the  balance  of  payments  classification,  correspond  to  contracts  with 
maturity superior to 360 days. When including net direct investment, we call this group 
"long-term flows expanded". 
 
Appendix D: Methodology used in the VAR estimation 
 
To estimate the VAR, we have used the following endogenous variables:
49 i) 
log-level of industrial production in Brazil (seasonally adjusted); ii) current account 
balance at constant prices (seasonally adjusted by the authors; ratio to the average GDP 
in the period);
50 iii) private capital account (ratio to the average GDP in the period); iv) 
log of terms of trade, measured as the ratio of export prices to import prices; v) EMBI+ 
Brazil, sovereign spread;
51 vi) log of real effective exchange rate (measured as the value 
of  foreign  currency  in  terms  of  domestic  currency);
52  and  vii)  real  interest  rate, 
measured as the Selic interest rate deflated by the IPCA.
53 The exogenous variables are 
the Fed Funds interest rate and the U.S. industrial production (seasonally adjusted). 
 
The  sample goes from 1995:1  through 2004:8. It starts  when the balance  of 
payments  statistics  on  a  monthly  basis  are  available  according  to  IMF’s  (1993) 
                                                
49 The data source are the following: i) IBGE; ii) and iii) BCB; iv) Funcex, available in Ipeadata; v) JP 
Morgan; vi) and vii) BCB. The estimations were conducted using basically the Rats software. 
50 We do not use the ratio to the current GDP because the large movements in the exchange ratio tend to 
distort the analysis: movements in the ratio can reflect changes in the exchange ratio rather than capital 
account  changes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  absence  of  normalization  generated  problems  for  the 
convergence of the algorithm to estimate the structural parameters. The same reasoning is valid for the 
private capital account. 
51  Average  of  daily  data  of  the  EMBI  Brazil  from  1992:1  through  1996:12,  and  the  EMBI+  Brazil 
thereafter. 
52 Estimated by the Central Bank of Brazil using the IPCA as internal deflator, and U.S. CPI as external 
deflator. It corresponds to the average of the domestic currency value in relation to 15 countries weighed 
by the participation of these countries in Brazil’s exports. 
53 We use the inflation accumulated in the last twelve  months  because  of the  difficulties in  using a 
measure for expected inflation for the whole sample. We use 12 months because of the volatility of the 
inflation rate of one or even six months. From 1995:01 through 1995:07, however, we use the average 
inflation in the period starting in 1994:09 instead of 12 months to avoid the distortions caused by the 
high-inflation period.   53 
methodology.  Furthermore, it  does  not  include  the  high-inflation  period.
54  We  have 
estimated  the  VAR  using  the  variables  in  levels,
55  employing  six  lags  for  the 
endogenous variables.




To  determine  the  identification  structure  concerning  the  contemporaneous 
effects  of  the  shocks,  we  have  considered  the  relationships  between  variables  and 
possible lags in the effects of one variable on another as well as the correlation of the 
estimated reduced-form residuals. First, we have assumed that current account, terms of 
trade and interest rate are not affected contemporaneously by shocks to other variables. 
Effective exports and imports are usually result of contracts set in advance.
58 Terms of 
trade,  besides  depending  on  exogenous  variables,  are  affected  by  pricing-to-market 
decisions,  which  tend  to  react  with  some  lag.  Although  interest  rate  is  a  financial 
variable, we are using the rate whose target is set by the Central Bank. We are assuming 
that  there  is  a  one-month  lag  in  the  reaction  of  the  Central  Bank  either  because 
information is not available promptly or because there is some lag in Central Bank' s 
decisions. In particular, the target for the basic interest rate is usually set on a monthly 
basis rather than on a daily basis.
59 Second, since the EMBI and exchange rate are 
financial variables, they tend to react more quickly. We assume then that reduced-form 
shocks to the other variables affect those variables contemporaneously. Third, for output 
and capital flows, we have used the matrix of correlation coefficients of reduced-form 
residuals. We have considered only residuals that have a correlation coefficient greater 
than 0.1, which led to assume that output responds contemporaneously to terms of trade, 
EMBI, exchange rate,
60 and interest rate, and capital flows to EMBI, exchange rate and 
interest rate. 
                                                
54 Thus, we do not face the problem of measuring the real interest rate in the high-inflation period and 
making it comparable to the low-inflation period. 
55 The estimation is consistent even in the presence of variables integrated of order one (Sims, Stock, and 
Watson, 1990; Hamilton, 1994). 
56 Schwarz criterion has indicated two lags, but, using a Lagrange multiplier test, we reject the  null 
hypothesis of absence of serial correlation in the residuals. We then add lags until accepting the null of no 
serial correlation. 
57  Further  lags  were  not  significant.  The  presence  of  one  lag  also  avoids  the  problem  of  spurious 
regression (Hamilton, 1994). 
58 Even in the case of terms of trade, the correlation coefficient between the reduced-form shock to that 
variable and to current account balance was not positive (–0.02). 
59 Even in the case of crises, the basic interest rate did not react in the same month. 
60 The correlation with exchange rate is low, but the coefficient was included to ease the convergence of 
the algorithm.   54 
 
The resulting structure was the following (time subscripts were omitted): 
 
14 15 16 17
35 36 37
51 52 53 54 56 57
61 62 63 64 65 67
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, 
 
where OUT, CA, KA, TOT, EMBI, ER, INT, OUT_US, and INT_US stand for output, 
current account, private capital account, terms of trade, EMBI+ Brazil, real effective 
exchange rate, real interest rate, U.S. output, and U.S. interest rate, respectively, c is a 
vector of constants, A and H are coefficient matrices, L is the lag operator, and e is the 
structural shock. Since there are 26 free parameters, the model is over-identified. Even 
though  most  of  the  structural  coefficients  are  not  significant,  we  can  accept  the 
identification restrictions (p-value of 0.293). 
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Figure 1
 Current Account and Private Capital Account 












































































































































































































































 Trade Balance and Income Balance
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Figure 3
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Figure 8   
Direct Investments, Portfolio Investments, Loans and Trade Credits and Other Short-Term Assets 
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Figure 9  








































































































































































Figure 10  




















Foreign Direct Investment (Net) Privatization
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Figure 11
Private Capital Account and Official-Agency-Related Loans 











































































































































































































Short- and Long-Term Debt Net Flows 
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Figure 13


















































































































































Gross external debt as a proportion of GDP Net external debt as a proportion of GDP










Public and Private External Debt 
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Figure 15
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Figure 17
Cumulative Index of Capital Control –






























































































































































































Note: Elaborated by the authors using the chronology in Appendix B. We have normalized December 1989 equal to 100, and assigned -1 to 






Cumulative Index of Capital Control on Inflows and Outflows –
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Figure 19






































































































































































Foreign Portfolio Investments - Brazilian Company Equities: Inflows versus Outflows 
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Figure 20.b
Foreign Portfolio Investment - Debt Securities: Inflows versus Outflows 



































































































































































































Other Foreign Investments – Other Long-Term Loans: Inflows versus Outflows 
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Figure 21
Capital and Financial Account, Current Account Deficit and Reserve Changes







































































































































































































































Share of the Capital and Finance Account Balance used for
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Figure 23
International Reserves - Liquidity Concept 
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Figure 25
Private Capital Account Balance (four-quarter cumulative balance - at 2003 prices) and GDP Growth 
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        Figure 27 
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1970 -1.97 0.54 3.01 1.75 2.79 10.40 7.20
1971 -3.31 -0.70 4.42 3.14 3.50 11.34 8.42
1972 -2.87 -0.41 6.46 5.53 7.12 11.94 9.05
1973 -2.48 0.01 4.89 3.91 7.63 13.97 11.07
1974 -6.80 -4.25 5.92 4.82 4.77 8.15 5.45
1975 -5.39 -2.73 4.91 4.14 3.11 5.17 2.58
1976 -4.17 -1.46 5.52 4.93 4.25 10.26 7.60
1977 -2.72 0.05 3.47 2.78 4.09 4.93 2.45
1978 -3.47 -0.51 5.91 5.17 5.91 4.97 2.54
1979 -4.79 -1.27 3.41 2.87 4.34 6.76 4.34
1980 -5.36 -1.19 4.04 3.56 2.91 9.20 6.80
1981 -4.53 0.47 4.93 4.36 2.90 -4.25 -6.34
1982 -6.00 0.29 4.46 1.95 1.47 0.83 -1.34
1983 -3.57 3.42 3.92 3.29 2.41 -2.93 -4.99
1984 0.05 6.90 3.44 0.96 6.32 5.40 3.20
1985 -0.12 5.91 0.09 -0.91 5.50 7.85 5.64
1986 -2.06 3.22 0.56 0.35 2.62 7.49 5.35
1987 -0.51 3.96 1.15 1.35 2.64 3.53 1.56
1988 1.37 6.28 -0.69 -1.09 2.99 -0.06 -1.88
1989 0.25 3.88 0.15 0.42 2.33 3.16 1.36
1990 -0.81 2.29 0.98 1.72 2.13 -4.35 -5.95
1991 -0.35 2.61 0.04 0.78 2.32 1.03 -0.66
1992 1.58 3.93 2.57 0.60 6.13 -0.54 -2.15
1993 -0.16 3.10 2.44 2.85 7.50 4.92 3.26
1994 -0.33 1.93 1.60 1.86 7.15 5.85 4.20
1995 -2.61 -0.49 4.12 4.33 7.35 4.22 2.62
1996 -3.03 -0.72 4.38 4.46 7.75 2.66 1.10
1997 -3.77 -0.84 3.19 3.07 6.46 3.27 1.72
1998 -4.24 -0.83 3.77 2.37 5.66 0.13 -1.36
1999 -4.72 -0.22 3.23 2.26 6.77 0.79 -0.71
2000 -4.02 -0.12 3.21 4.40 5.48 4.36 2.82
2001 -4.55 0.52 5.31 3.75 7.04 1.31 -0.17
2002 -1.66 2.86 1.74 -0.92 8.23 1.93 0.45
2003 0.82 4.89 1.01 0.50 9.73 0.54 -0.92
2004 1.94 5.60 -1.22 0.07 8.80 4.94 3.44
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), IBGE and authors'  calculations.
Balance of Payments (% of GDP) and GDP Growth
Table 1
 























1974-1982 -4.80 -1.18 4.73 3.84 3.75 5.03 2.59
1983-1994 -0.39 3.95 1.35 1.01 4.17 2.54 0.68
1995-1998 -3.41 -0.72 3.87 3.56 6.80 2.56 1.01
1999-2001 -4.43 0.06 3.91 3.47 6.43 2.14 0.63
2002-2004 0.37 4.45 0.51 -0.11 8.92 2.45 0.97
Source: BCB, IBGE and authors'   calculations.
Table 2





















1974–1982 0.56 0.03 0.17 2.86 0.07 0.20 0.53 -0.04
1983–1991 0.20 0.02 -0.02 0.40 -0.36 0.12 0.11 0.40
1992–2004 2.27 0.56 0.77 -0.18 0.08 -0.91 0.42 -0.40
1992-1996 0.53 0.86 1.61 0.62 0.72 -0.61 0.16 -1.14
1997-2004 3.36 0.36 0.25 -0.68 -0.31 -1.10 0.59 0.07
Source: BCB and authors'  calculations. 
Notes: The values of debt securities, portfolio investment and loans exclude the values related to the debt conversion under the Brady Plan.























Standard  Deviation 3077 1668 3718 4084 2813 2284 1799 4582 5166
Mean 3717 947 1559 2488 -100 2601 -1712 1645 1102
Variation Coefficient 0.83 1.76 2.39 1.64 -28.12 0.88 -1.05 2.78 4.69
Source: BCB and authors'  calculations.
Notes: See table 3.
Table 4
Volatilities of Net Capital Flows 



















Suppliers'  Trade 
Credits
Long-Term 
Buyers'  Trade 
Credits 
Inflows
Standard  Deviation 3852 5007 3112 2916 846 893 1006
Mean 5253 10046 5356 4690 1027 693 952
Variation Coefficient 0.73 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.82 1.29 1.06
Outflows
Standard  Deviation 965 4310 2719 2731 649 677 927
Mean 1287 7371 4268 2343 1051 722 1116
Variation Coefficient 0.75 0.58 0.64 1.17 0.62 0.94 0.83
Source: BCB and authors'  calculations.
Volatilities of Inflows and Outflows 
(quarterly data - 1992:1–2004:2 - US$ million - at 2003 prices)
Table 5









Equity Securities 1.00 0.27 0.34 0.43 0.48 -0.28
Debt Securities 0.27 1.00 0.36 0.15 0.97 -0.11
Loans 0.34 0.36 1.00 0.15 0.41 -0.38
Trade Credit 0.43 0.15 0.15 1.00 0.24 0.16
Portfolio 
Investments
0.48 0.97 0.41 0.24 1.00 -0.17
Direct 
Investments
-0.28 -0.11 -0.38 0.16 -0.17 1.00
Source: BCB and authors'  calculations. 
Notes: See table 3.
Table 6
Correlations across Capital Flows










Mexican 1994:4–1995:1 4,242 196 4,046
Asian 1997:4 9,000 1,364 7,636
Russian 1998:3 12,014 -17,290 29,304
1999:1 4,662 -5,499 10,161
1998:3–1999:1 12,014 -7,724 19,738
Argentinian 2001:4 6,264 1,454 4,810
2002:3–2002:4 3,271 -6,363 9,634
2002:2–2002:4 3,918 -3,045 6,962




Private Capital Account Balance
Private Capital Account Balance and Crises (US$ million - at current prices)
Crises Period
   73 
 
1974:1 1991:4 1992:1 2004:2 1992:1 1998:4 1999:1 2004:2
Current Account* 
lag (-4) -0.178 0.005 0.039 -0.216
lag (-3) -0.320 -0.190 -0.193 -0.312
lag (-2) -0.334 -0.238 -0.267 -0.365
lag (-1) -0.384 -0.284 -0.280 -0.501
contemporary -0.367 -0.262 -0.148 -0.544
lead (+1) -0.351 -0.235 -0.130 -0.501
lead (+2) -0.442 -0.338 -0.361 -0.460
lead (+3) -0.458 -0.381 -0.353 -0.507
lead (+4) -0.486 -0.418 -0.316 -0.454
Change in Reserves
contemporary 0.329 0.704 0.766 0.427




Correlation between Private Capital Account 




Account Deficit          
(a)=(c)-(b)
Domestic 
Saving         
(b)
Investment    
(c)    
1990-1994 (1) 0.6% 19.8% 20.4%
1995-1997 (2) 3.4% 18.2% 21.6%
1998-2001 (3) 4.4% 16.6% 21.0%
(2) – (1) 2.8 -1.6 1.2
Contribution to the increase 
in the CA deficit
100.0% 56.8% 43.2%
(3) – (2) 1.1 -1.6 -0.6
Contribution to the increase 
in the CA deficit
100.0% 153.2% -53.2%
Source: IBGE and authors'  calculations. 
Domestic Saving and Investment as a Share of GDP and their 












1990-1994 (1) 0.6% 1.8% 20.4% 78.4% 60.4% 18.0%
1995-1997 (2) 3.4% 1.4% 21.6% 80.4% 61.7% 18.8%
1998-2001 (3) 4.4% 2.9% 21.0% 80.6% 61.4% 19.1%
(2) – (1) 2.8 -0.5 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.8
Contribution to the increase in 
the CA deficit
100.0% -17.8% 43.2% 74.6% 45.5% 29.1%
(3) – (2) 1.1 1.5 -0.6 0.1 -0.3 0.4
Contribution to the increase in 
the CA deficit
100.0% 143.3% -53.2% 9.9% -17.3% 139.9%
Source: IBGE and authors'  calculations. 
Components of National Accounts as a Share of GDP and their Contribution to the Increase 
in the Current Account Deficit - 1990-2001
Table 10

















1974-1982 4.95 5.30 1.07 78.5 1.4 5.03 4.49 0.89
1983-1991 2.18 4.30 1.97 75.3 3.7 2.27 4.31 1.90
1992-2003 2.20 2.54 1.15 79.3 1.6 2.43 2.08 0.86
Source: IBGE and authors'  calculations.
Table 11
Growth Rate and Volatility of Consumption and GDP in Brazil – 1974:2003















Equities            
(1)








Constant 1938.9* 506.3* 488.2 122.2 1237.0** -882.4
(1164.9) (262.3) (701.8) (450.8) (537.9) (865.9)
U.S. Interest Rate 238.7 -14.0 147.4* 86.1 332.3*** -81.9
(175.7) (38.8) (78.0) (77.3) (64.8) (126.5)
Domestic Interest Rate 
(2) 95.5** 20.7** 30.0* 33.7** -70.2*** 19.7
(39.1) (8.7) (16.3) (15.6) (10.4) (29.6)
EMBI+ Brazil -426.6*** -0.7*** -1.7** -1.6*** 1.0* 114.2**
(127.8) (0.3) (0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (55.5)
R-squared 0.3201 0.1857 0.1914 0.2302 0.1810 0.0518
Adjusted R-squared 0.3015 0.1635 0.1693 0.2092 0.1587 0.0260
Unit Root Test for the 
Dependent Variable - p-value
 (3)
0.0071 0.0000 0.0984 0.0146 0.2343 0.0302
(3) P-value found using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Number of lags selected according to modified AIC, which generated the same number




Determinants of Capital Flows (1995:1–2004:8)
Notes: Standard errors—shown in parentheses—were corrected by Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix estimator. Estimation using two-stage least squares. Instrument variables: constant, U.S. interest rate, and the variables domestic rate and
Embi lagged one and two periods.  *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(2) Minus expected exchange rate depreciation.




























3 steps 1.6 54.0 0.3 1.1 1.8 1.5 26.0 15.3
12 steps 2.3 26.3 14.1 12.9 3.9 9.4 21.5 11.8
24 steps 2.7 19.5 19.0 20.1 5.6 9.7 16.4 9.9
Current Account
3 steps 0.9 0.5 82.0 0.1 0.3 2.0 3.3 11.8
12 steps 1.2 4.7 57.8 4.1 3.1 8.4 8.6 13.5
24 steps 1.2 4.3 54.1 6.9 3.3 9.0 8.6 13.7
Private Capital Account
3 steps 4.1 5.1 1.5 37.6 0.8 23.1 23.7 8.2
12 steps 5.1 7.4 6.4 31.9 3.7 19.2 22.3 9.2
24 steps 5.3 7.2 6.7 31.2 3.9 18.6 22.1 10.2
Terms of Trade
3 steps 1.6 0.5 0.4 4.0 80.6 4.6 8.6 1.3
12 steps 2.9 1.1 10.9 11.2 33.8 19.7 19.7 3.6
24 steps 3.7 0.9 23.5 19.7 22.6 17.4 12.7 3.1
EMBI Brazil
3 steps 1.8 0.9 1.3 22.5 2.4 44.3 27.2 1.5
12 steps 3.2 2.5 11.8 35.3 1.5 33.7 10.5 4.8
24 steps 3.4 2.7 15.6 34.1 1.6 30.8 9.9 5.4
Real Effective Exchange Rate
3 steps 5.5 8.1 0.1 12.2 11.2 3.0 61.2 4.2
12 steps 8.4 7.2 9.9 16.8 8.7 21.8 31.7 4.0
24 steps 8.9 6.8 14.3 16.5 9.0 19.8 29.1 4.4
Real Interest Rate
3 steps 3.4 1.1 0.6 11.5 0.1 5.1 18.5 63.2
12 steps 4.9 3.2 4.6 15.1 17.2 7.8 21.1 31.0
24 steps 5.6 3.2 7.2 13.2 15.5 12.2 22.3 26.3
Variance Error Decomposition (%) - SVAR (1995:01–2004:08)
* Standard errors are underestimated because their estimation assumes that coefficients are known.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 